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Regression discontinuity designs (RDDs) may not deliver reliable results if
units manipulate their running variables. It is commonly believed that imprecise
manipulations are harmless and, diagnostic tests detect precise manipulations.
However, we demonstrate that RDDs may fail to point-identify in the presence of
imprecise manipulation, and that not all harmful manipulations are detectable.
To formalize these claims, we propose a class of RDDs with harmless or de-
tectable manipulations over locally randomized running variables as manipulation-
robust RDDs. The conditions for the manipulation-robust RDDs may be intu-
itively verified using the institutional background. We demonstrate its verifica-
tion process in case studies of applications that use the McCrary (2008) density
test. The restrictions of manipulation-robust RDDs generate partial identifica-
tion results that are robust to possible manipulation. We apply the partial iden-
tification result to a controversy regarding the incumbency margin study of the
U.S. House of Representatives elections. The results show the robustness of the
original conclusion of Lee (2008).
Keywords: Regression Discontinuity Designs, Manipulation, Partial Identi-
fication.
1. INTRODUCTION
Regression discontinuity designs (RDDs) may fail to deliver reliable re-
sults if units manipulate their running variables. To validate the point-
identification in RDDs, two diagnostic tests are typically employed based
on the detection of harmful manipulation: a discontinuity test of the running
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2variable density (McCrary, 2008) and a balancing test of the pre-determined
covariates (Lee, 2008). However, these two diagnostic tests may not detect
the manipulations that bias the point estimates. Little is known about de-
tectable manipulations despite their popular use in applied contexts.
In this study, we characterize a class of RDDs with “detectable” manip-
ulation on the “locally” randomized running variable as the manipulation-
robust RDDs. Our characterization includes two steps. First, we characterize
a set of harmless manipulations by imposing two restrictions on manipula-
tion behavior. In this step, we demonstrate that the conventional wisdom of
the “absence of precise manipulation” is not sufficient to justify the point-
identification of the RDDs. Second, we propose a class of manipulation
behaviors that might confound the point-identification of the RDDs but
can be detected using the discontinuity in the density function. In the pro-
posed class of designs, accepting the null hypothesis of the running variable’s
smooth density implies the point-identification of the RDDs. Therefore, we
argue that applied researchers must verify whether their RDD satisfies the
conditions for a manipulation-robust RDD before running the diagnostic
tests.
To help utilize the proposed manipulation-robust RDDs in the empirical
context, we conduct an extensive survey of empirical RDD studies that use
the McCrary (2008) test as a robustness check of their point estimates.
Using various case studies based on empirical examples, we demonstrate
that the restrictions of the manipulation-robust RDDs may be intuitively
verified using institutional details.
We also show partial identification results that seem robust to the point-
identification failure due to manipulating the running variables. In the pro-
posed manipulation-robust RDD, the bounds have three different forms
based on the assessment of the underlying types of manipulation. The types
of manipulation are determined in the same step of the analysis to validate
3the conditions for the manipulation-robust RDDs; hence, no further assess-
ment is required in beyond the diagnostic tests.
In the empirical application to the U.S. House representative study, we
demonstrate that the original conclusion of Lee (2008) is robust to possible
manipulation of the running variable. In other words, the proposed bounds
can be informative regarding the sign of the average treatment effect (ATE)
at the cut-off.
1.1. Related literature
Diagnostic testing of the point-identification restriction
RDD is an identification strategy of the ATE when the treatment assign-
ment depends on a single running variable exceeding a cut-off value (or not).
For the point-identification of the ATE at a point of the cut-off, the condi-
tional mean function of the potential outcome must be smooth in the run-
ning variable at the cut-off value. (cf. Hahn et al., 2001; henceforth, we refer
to the smoothness of the conditional mean function as the HTV condition.)
However, the design and the cut-off point are often common knowledge.
Therefore, the potential manipulation of the running variables is a prac-
tical concern. If the tendency to manipulate is correlated to the potential
outcome values, the point-identification may fail. Lee (2008) interprets the
HTV condition as a consequence of local randomization around the cut-off.
The local randomization model of Lee (2008) implies not only that the HTV
condition holds, but also that two testable implications: covariate balanc-
ing at the cut-off and continuous density of the running variable. Various
testing methodologies have been developed for these two implications. For
the former, Canay and Kamat (2018) propose an inference strategy based
on a permutation test. For the latter, McCrary (2008) proposes testing the
discontinuous density of the running variable. Further developments of the
4discontinuity test have been proposed by Otsu et al. (2013), Cattaneo et al.
(2019), and Bugni and Canay (2020), among the others.
Local randomization may be interpreted as no manipulation. However,
many applications of RDDs assume units that influence the running vari-
able to some extent. The local randomization argument of Lee (2008) does
not clarify how an explicit manipulation of the running variable might not
violate the HTV condition. RDDs falling between “no manipulation at all”
and “some manipulations not violating the HTV condition”, have been in-
formally discussed. 1 Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no formal
statement has been made to fill this gap in research.
Without the local randomization argument, neither covariate balancing
nor the smoothness of the density of the running variable need to hold when
the HTV condition holds. The HTV condition and the other testable impli-
cations are not nested in general, but they are independent consequences of
local randomization. Therefore, no formal statement supports the validity
of the density test and the covariate balancing test when units might have
manipulated the running variable. McCrary (2008) acknowledges that the
smoothness of the density of the running variable is neither necessary nor
sufficient for the HTV condition unless an auxiliary assumption holds; how-
ever, such an assumption is not formally stated. McCrary (2008) conjectures
that the monotonicity of the manipulation relative to the locally randomized
raw running variable might be sufficient, but we show that monotonicity is
neither sufficient nor necessary for the validity of the density test.
We contribute to the literature by identifying the sufficient conditions
that need to be verified before running the density test, as a robustness
1For example, Lee and Lemieux (2010) claims that the disability of precise manip-
ulation of the assignment variable leads to local randomization, and McCrary (2008)
argues that “partial manipulation” with an idiosyncratic element in the running variable
does not lead to identification problems in typical cases. See the actual quotes and our
discussion against these claims in Section 2.1.
5check of the point estimates. The sufficient conditions may be intuitively
verified using the institutional background, and the institutional details
are often provided for the informal justification of the local randomization
argument in Lee (2008). A part of the sufficient conditions serves as a formal
argument for maintaining the HTV condition when the locally randomized
running variable is manipulated. In contrast with the conventional wisdom
regarding the “absence of precise manipulation” as a justification for the
HTV condition against manipulation, we show that sorting around the cut-
off may occur in the absence of precise manipulation. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study to show that sorting may occur not only
in the presence of precise manipulation into the treated group, around the
cut-off, but also as a result of other manipulation to exit the control group,
around the cut-off. Since the exit from the local neighborhood of the cut-off
does not require precise control of the manipulation, the absence of precise
control of the manipulation is not enough to justify the HTV condition.
Furthermore, the proposed framework reveals that covariate balancing
should also hold when the null hypothesis of the smooth density of the run-
ning variable is accepted. Therefore, the covariate balancing test may serve
as an additional diagnostic test of the validity of the manipulation-robust
RDD. It also suggests a sequential procedure of the diagnostic tests for
the manipulation-robust RDD: run the density test for the HTV condition
within the manipulation-robust RDD, and if the test is passed, run the co-
variate balancing test to assess the assumptions of the manipulation-robust
RDD.
One notable alternative testing strategy is proposed by Arai et al. (2019),
who consider the testable restrictions of a fuzzy regression discontinuity
design. The merit of Arai et al. (2019) is the ability to directly test the
identification restrictions of the fuzzy design without using the density of
the running variable. However, their testable restrictions are only valid for
6the fuzzy designs, and the restrictions automatically hold in sharp designs.
Therefore, our proposed framework complements Arai et al. (2019) as their
procedure does not suit sharp designs. We also complement the other test-
ing techniques mentioned earlier because these strategies remain valid and
useful within our manipulation-robust RDDs.
Partial identification under manipulation
Few studies address alternative estimation procedures when an RDD is
subject to possible manipulation, and many studies impose particular shape
restrictions on the distribution of the counterfactual running variables in the
absence of manipulation. Bajari et al. (2011) exploit a structural model of
the observed running variable in terms of the latent running variable to fill
the “donut-hole” in the observed running variable distribution.
Davis et al. (2013), Diamond and Persson (2016), and Rosenman and
Rajkumar (2019) assume that manipulation occurs within a known subset
of the support of the running variable around the cut-off. In contrast, our
basic bounds do not rely on these particular shape restrictions. One notable
exception from these approaches is Gerard et al. (2020), who deliver a par-
tial identification result for a particular type of manipulation without shape
restrictions. Gerard et al. (2020) consider the manipulation implying a sub-
set of units that always take their running variables above the threshold.
A key innovation of Gerard et al. (2020) is that their proposed model does
not assume the existence of the running variable when the running variable
was not manipulated.
We contribute to this partial identification literature by offering a full set
of bounds for various manipulation behaviors, given the restrictions of the
proposed manipulation-robust RDD. While one of the bounds is numerically
similar to that of Gerard et al. (2020), we cannot directly compare this
study’s findings to the result of Gerard et al. (2020), as the underlying
7models are not nested. However, we complement Gerard et al. (2020) by
showing bounds for manipulation behaviors not considered in Gerard et al.
(2020), while we have additional model components and restrictions. 2
Roadmap
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we intro-
duce the proposed manipulation-robust RDDs with possible manipulations
and its consequences. In Section 3, we illustrate our manipulation-robust
RDDs using case studies from our extensive survey of the empirical lit-
erature citing the McCrary (2008) test. In Section 4, we demonstrate our
partial identification results. In Section 5, we extend the basic sharp bounds
into fuzzy designs and with exclusion restrictions of covariates. In Section 6,
we apply our procedure to an incumbency study of the U.S. House election.
The final section concludes the paper.
2. MANIPULATION-ROBUST REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN
Consider a setting in which we observe (X, Y,D), where X ∈ R is the
running variable, Y ∈ R is the outcome of interest, and D ∈ {0, 1} is
the treatment status. The observed outcome Y has the following potential
outcome structure:
Y = DY (1) + (1−D)Y (0)
2In Gerard et al. (2020), manipulating units must almost surely exceed the cut-off. As
a by-product of the restrictions of the manipulation-robust RDD, we also consider the
uncertain manipulation behavior of the units that decide whether or not to manipulate
based on an unobserved component (the locally random raw running variable) assigned
to the units.
8where Y (d) represents the potential outcome for each assignment d ∈ {0, 1}.
The treatment status D is determined by the running variable such that
D = 1{X ≥ c},
where c is the cut-off value. Throughout this study, we assume the following
regularity assumptions of X
Assumption 2.1 (Regularity conditions for X) The running variable X
has a density function fX(x) satisfying the following requirements: (i) there
exist fX(c+) ≡ limx↓c fX(x) and fX(c−) ≡ limx↑c fX(x), and (ii) fX(c+)
and fX(c−) are strictly positive.
The assumptions above exclude extreme X variables. One notable ex-
ample of extreme distribution is a point-mass in the density function of X.
Although the point-mass is a frequent and important feature of RDDs, such
discrete nature of X inevitably involves failures of the point-identification
aside from the manipulation of X variables. Therefore, we do not consider
discrete running variables in this study.
2.1. Sufficient conditions for the point-identification in the presence of
possible manipulations
Hahn et al. (2001) show the point-identification restriction for the ATE
at the cut-off value E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X = c] in the presence of smooth condi-
tional mean functions E[Y (d)|X = x] at c for each d ∈ {0, 1}. We refer to
this condition as the HTV condition. This condition is sufficient to identify
the ATE, but the smoothness of the mean function is hard to interpret in
general.
Lee (2008) interprets the HTV assumption as local randomization, in
other words, randomization of units around the cut-off value. Local ran-
9domization is intuitive and reasonable if researchers believe that the units
in their design do not alter the running variable around the cut-off. However,
it is not clear how we would justify the “randomization” if the units are able
to alter the running variable. We start by considering a “non-manipulated
running variable,” X∗, separately from the observed running variable, X,
following McCrary (2008). McCrary (2008) considers X∗ as the running
variable in a counterfactual in which the program is absent. Therefore, we
may assume local randomization for the unobserved non-manipulated run-
ning variable X∗, as follows:
Assumption 2.2 (Local Randomization ofX∗) The non-manipulated run-
ning variable X∗ has density function fX∗(x) and conditional mean function
E[Y (d)|X∗ = x]. Furthermore, E[Y (d)|X∗ = x] and fX∗(x) are continuous
in x.
Hence, in the absence of manipulation, X = X∗ almost surely, the ATE
E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X∗ = c] = E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X = c]
is point-identified.
Based on the notion of X∗, we define the manipulation of the running
variable as the event X 6= X∗. We impose the following regularity assump-
tions for density functions and conditional mean functions conditional on
the event of manipulation:
Assumption 2.3 (Regularity conditions for X∗) For every x and x∗ in
the appropriate supports conditional on either X = X∗ or X 6= X∗, (i)
there exist the conditional density functions, fX∗|X=X∗(x∗), fX∗|X 6=X∗(x∗),
fX|X∗,X=X∗(x|x∗), and fX|X∗,X 6=X∗(x|x∗), (ii) there exist the conditional ex-
pectation functions E[Y (d)|X∗ = x∗, X = X∗], E[Y (d)|X∗ = x∗, X 6= X∗],
E[Y (d)|X = x,X = X∗], E[Y (d)|X = x,X 6= X∗], E[Y (d)|X = x,X∗ =
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x∗X = X∗], and E[Y (d)|X = x,X∗ = x∗, X 6= X∗] and (iii) there exist
E[Y (d)|X = c+, X 6= X∗] ≡ lim
x↓c
E[Y (d)|X = x,X 6= X∗],
and
E[Y (d)|X = c−, X 6= X∗] ≡ lim
x↑c
E[Y (d)|X = x,X 6= X∗].
Given the non-manipulated X∗, Lee (2008) and McCrary (2008) consider
verbal justifications for the local randomization for X as units do not pre-
cisely decide the extent of manipulation X −X∗. Formally, we consider the
sorting based on the extent of manipulation X−X∗ as the “precise manipu-
lation”, and we define our notion of the absence of the precise manipulation
below:
Assumption 2.4 (No precise manipulation) For all x∗ with P (X 6= X∗|X∗ =
x∗) > 0, fX|X∗,X 6=X∗(x|x∗) and E[Y (d)|X = x,X 6= X∗] are uniformly
bounded and continuous in x at c.
The above assumption holds if units X∗ = x∗ manipulate the running
variable X 6= X∗, but the units cannot decide X relative to X∗ precisely to
be treated.
The “absence of precise control” justification has been emphasized in
seminal works and widely adopted in many applied studies of the RDD. For
example, McCrary (2008) argues that
Partial manipulation occurs when the running variable is under
the agent’s control, but also has an idiosyncratic element. Typi-
cally, partial manipulation of the running variable does not lead
to identification problems.
and Lee and Lemieux (2010) states that
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If individuals—even while having some influence—are unable to
precisely manipulate the assignment variable, a consequence of
this is that the variation in treatment near the threshold is ran-
domized as though from a randomized experiment.
The above Assumption 2.4 is in line with the seminal works as it restricts
every unit may attempt to manipulate, but the unit cannot sort themselves
above the cut-off. However, the point-identification may fail due to selec-
tive behaviors to manipulate even though the units cannot pin down X
precisely above the cut-off. By the absence of precise manipulation, ma-
nipulations into the treated group around the cut-off do not generate the
sorting. However, the sorting around the cut-off may still occur due to ma-
nipulation to exit the control group around the cut-off since a large enough
manipulation allows the units just below the cut-off to exceed the thresh-
old. Since incentive to exit from the neighborhood of the cut-off differs by
their treatment status, the conventional wisdom of the “absence of precise
control” is not enough to justify the HTV condition. 3
We call the sorting based on the units that attempt the manipulation
“unit sorting,” and we explicitly eliminate such sorting by introducing the
following assumption:
Assumption 2.5 (No unit sorting) For every x∗, P (X 6= X∗|X∗ = x∗)
and E[Y (d)|X∗ = x∗, X 6= X∗] are continuous at x∗ = c.
Assumption 2.5 implies that the tendency to attempt manipulations and
the outcome of the units that manipulate do not differ across the cut-off.
The following statement shows that the absence of two sorting mecha-
nisms is sufficient to guarantee the point-identification.
3An example of the failure of the point-identification appears as one of our results as
Lemma 2.3.
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Lemma 2.1 Suppose that the data generating process (X∗, X, Y (d), D) sat-
isfies Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. Suppose also that both Assumptions 2.4
and 2.5 hold for the whole units, then the HTV assumption for X holds at
X = c, and therefore,
E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X = c]
is point-identified. Furthermore, fX(x) is continuous at x = c.
The main message of this result is that we need local randomization not
just for the subset of units who manipulate, but also for the other subset of
units who do not manipulate. Since the absence of the precise manipulation
imposes the balancing of the former units only, it is not enough to justify
the HTV condition.
Proof: Proof in Appendix A. Q.E.D.
2.2. Sufficient conditions for the valid density test
While the McCrary (2008) density test aims to detect manipulation that
may harm the point-identification, the acceptance of the density test is
neither necessary nor sufficient for the point-identification unless “auxiliary”
assumptions are introduced. As manipulations in the running variable in
both directions around the cut-off would cancel out the discontinuity in the
density function, we may not detect the sorting even though the potential
outcomes may be sorted.
Unfortunately, the required auxiliary assumptions have not yet been iden-
tified. McCrary (2008) suggests monotonicity of the manipulation, X ≥ X∗
or X ≤ X∗ almost surely, as a candidate restriction. However, monotonicity
is neither sufficient nor necessary to validate the density test. 4
4See Remark 2.3 for a discussion, and see Appendix E for a counterexample showing
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Instead, we consider two restrictions on the sorting behavior in violation
of Assumptions 2.4 or 2.5, or both.
First, we allow the manipulation to be precise but only in one direction
of the running variable:
Assumption 2.6 (One-sided Precise Manipulation) If P (X 6= X∗) > 0,
then
P (X ≥ c|X 6= X∗) = 1.
Assumption 2.6 restricts the manipulation that violates Assumption 2.4.
If Assumption 2.4 is violated, the manipulating units, X 6= X∗, may pin
down the value of X to be treated, X ≥ c. However, we cannot detect such
precise manipulation if it happens in both directions: to be treated, X ≥ c,
and not to be treated, X < c. Assumption 2.6 imposes a restriction on
precise manipulation such that almost every unit follows the incentive to be
treated X ≥ c and succeeds in exceeding the threshold c if they manipulate
the running variable X 6= X∗.
Remark 2.1 Assumption 2.6 is a restriction for the precise manipulation
that violates Assumption 2.4, but Assumption 2.6 does not preclude Assump-
tion 2.5 to hold. For example, if precise manipulation occurs independently
from the given value of raw X∗, then, Assumption 2.5 holds. Moreover, if
precise manipulation occurs only among units whose X∗ are far below the
threshold X∗ < c, Assumption 2.5 is not violated because Assumption 2.5
only imposes restrictions on the other units around X∗ = c.
Furthermore, we would allow the units to selectively attempt to manipu-
late, but the selection should be complete in one-sided:
that monotonicity is not sufficient.
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Assumption 2.7 (One-sided Unit Sorting)
P (X 6= X∗|X∗ ≥ c) = 0.
Assumption 2.7 restricts manipulation behavior that violates Assumption
2.5. If Assumption 2.5 is violated, the interested units may have decided to
manipulate based on their X∗ exceeding the cut-off or not. Therefore, the
units below the threshold X < c may behave differently from the units
above the threshold X ≥ c.
We may not detect such sorting if the units manipulate in both directions:
the control group X∗ < c to be treated X ≥ c, and the treated X∗ ≥ c not
to be treated X < c. Therefore, we introduce Assumption 2.7 to impose
that sorting only happens within the control group X∗ < c to be treated
X ≥ c.
Remark 2.2 In line with Assumption 2.6, Assumption 2.7 restricts the
sorting of units violating Assumption 2.5. Therefore, Assumption 2.7 does
not eliminate the possibility that the manipulation cannot be precise, namely,
satisfying Assumption 2.4. Units satisfying Assumption 2.7 but also satisfy-
ing Assumption 2.4 selectively manipulate, aiming to exceed the threshold,
but their attempts may fail.
For the validity of the test, we need to impose the following regularity
condition.
Assumption 2.8 (Technical condition for the validity) There exists some
 > 0 such that P (|X −X∗| > |X 6= X∗) = 1.
This technical condition is imposed to avoid a complicated limit argument
that requires the consideration of infinitesimal extents of manipulation and
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infinitesimal neighborhoods around the cut-off. We use this assumption only
for Lemma 2.3 and Theorem 2.1.
The following lemmas formalize the above ideas that one-sided sorting is
detectable.
First, the following statement shows that the McCrary (2008) test is valid
as a robustness test for point-identification if the manipulations of units
follow Assumptions 2.6 and 2.7.
Lemma 2.2 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. For the sub-
set of units satisfying Assumption 2.6 and 2.7, we obtain
E[Y (d)|X = c+] =
(
fX∗(c)
fX(c+)
)
· E[Y (d)|X∗ = c]
+
(
fX(c+)− fX∗(c)
fX(c+)
)
· E[Y (d)|X = c+, X > X∗],(2.1)
E[Y (d)|X = c−] =
(
fX∗(c)
fX(c−)
)
· E[Y (d)|X∗ = c]
+
(
fX(c−)− fX∗(c)
fX(c−)
)
· E[Y (d)|X∗ = c−, X > X∗].(2.2)
Furthermore, the non-manipulated density fX∗ satisfies fX(c−) ≤ fX∗(c) ≤
fX(c+). Therefore, E[Y (d)|X = c+] = E[Y (d)|X = c−] = E[Y (d)|X∗ = c]
when fX(c−) = fX(c+) = fX∗(c).
Proof: Proof in Appendix A. Q.E.D.
Second, the following statement shows that the McCrary (2008) test is
also valid if the manipulation cannot be precise, thus satisfying Assumption
2.4, while there may be sorting of the units around the cut-off in a way that
reflects Assumption 2.7.
Lemma 2.3 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.8 hold. For the
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subset of units satisfying Assumption 2.4 and 2.7,
E[Y (d)|{X = X∗ = x}, {X 6= X∗, X∗ = x}, or {X 6= X∗, X = x}]
= E[Y (d)|{X∗ = x} or {X 6= X∗, X = x}]
is continuous at x = c and we obtain
E[Y (d)|X = c+] = E [Y (d)|{X∗ = c} or {X 6= X∗, X = c}] ,
E[Y (d)|X = c−] =
(
fX(c+)
fX(c−)
)
· E [Y (d)|{X∗ = c} or {X 6= X∗, X = c}]
+
(
1− fX(c+)
fX(c−)
)
· E[Y (d)|X∗ = c−, X 6= X∗].
Therefore,
E[Y (d)|X = c+] = E[Y (d)|X = c−]
= E[Y (d)|{X∗ = c} or {X 6= X∗, X = c}]
when fX(c−) = fX(c+).
Proof: Proof in Appendix A. Q.E.D.
This statement implies that the HTV condition holds for the subset of
units {X∗ = x} or {X 6= X∗, X = x}, either assigned near x, {X∗ = x} or
manipulated near to x, {X 6= X∗, X = x}. The HTV condition holds for
the former units because the assignment of X∗ is locally random, while it
holds for the latter units because the manipulating units X 6= X∗ cannot
precisely locate themselves at X = c+ rather than at X = c−. However,
the observed moment for Y (d) conditional on X = x is not continuous at
x = c because the units assigned just below X∗ < c and just above X∗ ≥ c
behave differently in the manipulation decision. Assumption 2.8 allows us
to exclude units that take an infinitesimal extent of manipulation to stay
below the cut-off, thus avoiding a complicated limit argument.
Finally, the following statement shows that the McCrary (2008) test is
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valid if the manipulation is made precisely following Assumption 2.6, while
such precise manipulation does not selectively occur just below the cut-off,
thus satisfying Assumption 2.5.
Lemma 2.4 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. For the sub-
set of units satisfying Assumption 2.5 and 2.6, E[Y (d)|X∗ = x∗, X = X∗]
is continuous at x∗ = c and we obtain
E[Y (d)|X = c+] =
(
fX(c−)
fX(c+)
)
· E[Y (d)|X∗ = c,X = X∗]
+
(
1− fX(c−)
fX(c+)
)
· E[Y (d)|X = c+, X 6= X∗],
E[Y (d)|X = c−] = E[Y (d)|X∗ = c,X = X∗].
Therefore,
E[Y (d)|X = c+] = E[Y (d)|X = c−] = E[Y (d)|X∗ = c,X = X∗]
when fX(c−) = fX(c+) = fX∗(c).
Proof: Proof in Appendix A. Q.E.D.
2.3. Characterization of “detectable” manipulations
The four lemmas 2.1–2.4 show that the McCrary (2008) test is valid for
each “Type” of units satisfying its corresponding restrictions on X manipu-
lated from the locally randomized raw values X∗. To be valid, the McCrary
(2008)test only requires that almost every unit in the data generating pro-
cess falls into one of these types.
Assumption 2.9 (One-sided Sorting) We assume that almost every unit
in the data generating process is of one of the following types:
• (Type 0) units, which would never manipulate X = X∗,
• (Type 1) units, which satisfy Assumptions 2.4 (No precise manipula-
tion) and 2.5 (No unit sorting),
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• (Type 2) units, which satisfy Assumptions 2.6 (One-sided precise ma-
nipulation) and 2.7 (One-sided unit sorting),
• (Type 3) units, which satisfy Assumptions 2.4 (No precise manipula-
tion) and 2.7 (One-sided unit sorting), or
• (Type 4) units, which satisfy Assumptions 2.5 (No unit sorting) and
2.6 (One-sided precise manipulation).
The following statement summarizes the study’s main results:
Theorem 2.1 Suppose Assumption 2.9 holds. Suppose also that for each
subset of units of the Types defined in Assumption 2.9, the data generating
process (X∗, X, Y (d), D) satisfies Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.8.
Then, if fX(x) is continuous at the cut-off x = c, then the HTV condition
holds, therefore,
E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X = c]
is point-identified.
Remark 2.3 McCrary (2008) conjectures the almost sure monotonicity of
manipulation, X ≥ X∗ or X ≤ X∗, as a sufficient condition for the validity
of the McCrary (2008) test. However, our results show that monotonicity is
neither sufficient nor necessary for the validity of the McCrary (2008) test.
Type 2 units, as defined in Assumption 2.9, satisfy the monotonicity as-
sumption as P (X ≥ X∗) = 1. However, monotonicity is not sufficient to
validate the density test because monotone manipulation may occur in re-
sponse to the other unknown cut-off c′ < c in addition to the policy threshold
c. If only a subset of units responds to such a lower threshold, c′, a smooth
density of X may be observed, while the units are differently sorted below
and above the cut-off. Assumption 2.6 eliminates such possibility. 5
5See Appendix E for a counter-example that monotone manipulation may result in a
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Furthermore, Type 1 and Type 4 units are allowed to manipulate their X
against the monotonicity assumption. For example, Type 1 units may exhibit
manipulations in both directions as they do not generate sorting. Therefore,
the monotonicity of X ≥ X∗ is almost surely stronger than necessary for
the validity of the McCrary (2008) test. Similarly, Type 4 units may exhibit
manipulations in both directions given the assigned value X∗ as long as the
precise manipulation violating Assumption 2.4 only occurs in one direction.
Type 3 units are allowed to manipulate their X against the monotonicity
assumption as well, while their non-monotone manipulation is limited not
to alter the treatment status because Assumption 2.7 prohibits units from
manipulating when their X∗ exceeds the cut-off.
Since Type 1 units (which relate to the partial manipulation in McCrary,
2008) and the other types (which relate to the complete manipulation in
McCrary, 2008) might be mixed in the same design, monotonicity is neither
sufficient nor necessary for the validity of the density test.
Proof of Theorem 2.1: Let T ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} be an indicator of the
types of the units, from Type 0 through Type 4. As a result, almost every
unit belongs to either one of these five types.
From the proofs of Lemmas 2.1–2.4, for j = 0, 1, · · · , 4, we obtain:
fX|T=j(c−) ≤ fX|T=j(c+).
Hence, if fX(x) is continuous at x = c, then fX|T=j(x) is also continuous at
x = c for all j. Using Bayes’ rule, we obtain:
P (T = j|X = x) = fX|T=j(x) · P (T = j)
fX(x)
.
This result implies that P (T = j|X = x) is continuous at x = c for all j
if fX(x) is continuous at x = c. From Lemmas 2.1–2.4, the continuity of
non-detectable manipulation that causes a bias in the point-estimate.
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fX|T=j(x) implies that E[Y (d)|X = x, T = j] is continuous at x = c for
j = 1, · · · , 4. Since P (X = X∗|T = 0) = 1, we obtain E[Y (d)|X = x, T =
0] = E[Y (d)|X∗ = x, T = 0], which implies that E[Y (d)|X = x, T = 0] is
continuous at x = c. As a result, we obtain the continuity of E[Y (d)|X = x]
if fX(x) is continuous at x = c. Q.E.D.
Finally, Theorem 2.1 relates the other diagnostic tests of covariate bal-
ancing (cf. Lee, 2008) when we replace the assumptions on Y (d) with the
assumptions on covariates W . Given the logic of the local randomization of
X∗, it is natural to believe that Assumption 2.2 holds not only for Y (d) but
also for the pre-determined covariates W .
Corollary 2.1 Let W be a covariate pre-determined by the treatment
assignment D. Let Y (1) ≡ W and Y (0) ≡ W as W not be affected by D.
Let Y ≡ Y (1)D + Y (0)(1−D) = W .
Suppose Assumption 2.9 holds. Suppose that for each subset of units of the
types defined in Assumption 2.9, the data generating process of (X∗, X,W,D)
satisfies Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.8.
Then, if fX(x) is continuous at the cut-off x = c,
E[W |X = c+]− E[W |X = c−] = 0.
Proof: The results immediately follow from the proof of Theorem 2.1 by
replacing Y (d) with W for each d ∈ {0, 1}. Q.E.D.
The above Corollary 2.1 states that if the McCrary (2008) test for the
density smoothness is passed, the covariates W should be balanced around
the cut-off. As the smoothness of the density is not necessary for covariate
balancing, the covariate balancing test might not be informative on the HTV
condition of Y (d) when the density is discontinuous. However, when the
discontinuity test is passed, the covariate balancing test serves as a further
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robustness check for the assumptions of the density test. Therefore, these
results suggest that these diagnostic tests should be operated sequentially
rather than simultaneously, as often happens in empirical applications.
In the next section, we assess RDDs in empirical examples using the
McCrary (2008) test to check for robustness.
3. CASE STUDY WITH EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES
In the previous section, we argued that every unit in the RDD must be
one of five manipulation types before using the diagnostic tests.
In this section, we demonstrate how empirical research should proceed
to verify the conditions for the manipulation-robust RDD. Using Google
Scholar citations, we survey the most cited 100 papers and the most cited
100 papers published after 2016. Among approximately 60 papers with RDD
applications citing McCrary (2008)density test, we review 39 papers with
verbal descriptions of the nature of possible manipulation. We find that the
knowledge of X∗ and the cut-off is useful in categorizing cases.
We also find that approximately half of the 39 papers conceive the possi-
bility that some units may know the running variable X∗ and the cut-off. In
the case of Type 2 or Type 3 units, we require a justification for one-sided
unit sorting (Assumption 2.7) and one-sided precise manipulation (Assump-
tion 2.6) unless one can justify why their manipulations cannot be precise.
(Assumption 2.4). In the next subsection, we consider two RDD applications
to exemplify the process of manipulation-robust RDD.
The remaining papers may contend that the units do not know the cut-off;
therefore, they cannot determine whether they would exceed the cut-off or
not in the raw value of X∗. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that those
unsure about exceeding the cut-off with X∗ are capable of manipulating to
exactly exceed the cut-off by c−X∗. Therefore, one might argue that these
units are Type 1 units. However, Type 4 units may also exist in this setting.
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There might be unobserved “exception rules” that allow a subset of units to
be treated regardless of the raw assignment X∗. In Section 3.2, we describe
two RDD applications in this setting.
Voting RDDs have a special nature as no one can determine whether a
candidate will win or lose in a close election. Unless an explicit ex-post vot-
ing fraud is possible, the “exception rule” hardly applies. Nevertheless, it is
possible to violate the “no precise manipulation” assumption (Assumption
2.4). The other source of violation is that the units that know that they are
far below the cut-off might manipulate ex-ante to exceed the cut-off for sure.
While such violations may be rare, a strong political campaign might alter a
surely losing election into a surely winning election. Researchers should test
if these “strong” campaigns exist, or at least are not pushed to the neigh-
borhood of the cut-off. However, the testing requires a justification for the
one-sided precise manipulation (Assumption 2.6). The justification for such
violations can be tricky when the manipulation incentive and ability move
in either direction of the running variable. Elections are typical situations
in which two forces attempt to alter the results from opposite directions.
In Section 3.3, we highlight the distinction and our concern in some voting
RDDs using three empirical applications.
3.1. Examples with known X∗ relative to the cut-off
In many contexts, some units know the realized running variable X∗ as
well as the cut-off value. In such designs, sorting achieved by the manipu-
lation of X is a natural concern. Therefore, the availability of a diagnostic
test is crucial to verify that possible manipulation does not generate bias in
the point estimates.
To run the diagnostic test of McCrary (2008) in this case of known X∗
and the cut-off, we need to justify Assumption 2.7 to conclude that those
units who manipulate are either Type 2 or Type 3 units (aside from the
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safer Type 1 units). One way to rationalize is that the manipulation is led
by an economic incentive to get treated X ≥ c so that no one wants to
manipulate when there is no incentive to manipulate as X∗ ≥ c. Similar
incentive would justify Assumption 2.6 that there are Type 2 units if the
manipulation is always precise. One may also argue that the manipulation
cannot be precise (Assumption 2.4) due to institutional background, and
we would conclude that there are Type 3 units. In either case, it is essential
to run the McCrary (2008)’s test because either Type 2 or Type 3 units
would devastate the point-identification of the RDDs.
Reporting income manipulation for tuition subsidy eligibility
Garibaldi et al. (2012) investigates the causal effect of a continuation
tuition increase on the probability of late graduation. Bocconi University
adopts a continuation tuition reduction policy for students from households
whose reported family income is below certain thresholds. They exploit the
discrete nature of the tuition values to apply an RDD to answer the causal
question.
Bocconi University assigns admitted students into one of twelve tuition
brackets based on the family income reported from applicants. Note that
the family income X∗ itself is private information known only to families,
and the bracket thresholds seem also known. Therefore, we should expect
violations in the absence of unit sorting (Assumption 2.5) because families
may want to manipulate their reported taxable income to be assigned to a
lower income bracket with lower tuition payments. However, the admission
process of Bocconi University allows us to justify the one-sided unit sorting
(Assumption 2.7). Since the income bracket assignment only happens af-
ter the admission decision (the entrance exam), families might manipulate
their reported income only to reduce their tuition payments. We may argue
that there is no incentive to manipulate their reported income to pay higher
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tuition. Thus, the unit sorting should satisfy Assumption 2.7, and the units
would be either Type 2 or Type 3. The above justifications also rationalize
the one-sided precise manipulation (Assumption 2.6). These units would
manipulate only to increase and exceed the cut-off. Families would not at-
tempt to take such a risky fabrication of the income reports for different
reasons. Therefore, we argue that the units that manipulate are Type 2
units; hence, we may apply the McCrary (2008) test to validate the point-
identification results.
Hotel rating manipulation
Ghose et al. (2012) apply an RDD as supporting evidence for the causal
effect of user-generated content such as rating on demand for hotels. The
ratings shown in Travelocity.com and TripAdvisors.com are average ratings
submitted by users “rounded” to the closest half rating star. This rounding
in the average reviews generates discontinuity in the rating shown on the
website. Using this discontinuity, they use an RDD to estimate the causal
effect of the rating.
The raw average scores and all the reviews are public information. There-
fore, hotels know their own X∗ and the cut-off to improve their rating shown
on the website. Manipulation in this context means that hotels may submit
a fake review to improve their score. In this case, the authors may argue
that such a risky behavior would be taken only to exceed the threshold
needed to obtain an extra star in the rating score. Hence, such hotels are
considered as Type 2 units, and the acceptance of the McCrary (2008) test
implies the absence of Type 2 units and the point-identification of the ATE
at the cut-off.
Another possibility is that some hotels attempt manipulating the rating
to exceed the cut-off but not systematically. The TripAdvisors.com system
seems to be based on weighted averages rather than simple averages. There-
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fore, it may be hard for hotels to manipulate the star rating. Then, those
hotels may be considered Type 3 units. In the case of mixed Type 2 and
Type 3 units (as well as other safer types), the McCrary (2008) test may
still be employed as a robustness check.
In some cases, the rating platform penalizes firms that do not pay “loyal-
ties.” For example, some websites may set a glass ceiling for the rating stars
for those not paying the fees for the “premium” service. In this case, the
manipulation incentive would push down the stars that are only marginally
above the cut-off. Such manipulation would invalidate the McCrary (2008)
test, as some units do not belong to any of the five types.
3.2. Examples without knowing X∗ or the cut-off
Limited information on X∗ and cut-off may be used as a justification
for the validity of the RDD as, in this setting, “precise” manipulation is
impossible. In this case, Type 1 units are more likely than in the case of
known X∗ and cut-off because unit sorting does not occur (Assumption
2.5).
Two possible scenarios exist. If researchers truly believe that the units
are either Type 1 or Type 0, the density of X should be continuous. How-
ever, the covariate balancing test remains valid. The covariate balancing
and the smooth density are necessary for the underlying conditions for
manipulation-robust RDDs. Thus, the smooth density and balanced co-
variates may be jointly tested.
In the case of unknown X∗ and the cut-off, precise manipulation may
occur in two ways. First, X may be manipulated independently from X∗
by a hidden policy rule or exception. Second, the units might know that
their X∗ are far below the cut-off, and then, some “strong” units may be
able to manipulate X to surely exceed the cut-off. Therefore, if researchers
concern the presence of other types, then we must verify that these manip-
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ulation violating Assumption 2.4 fall into the Type 4 units, thus satisfying
Assumption 2.6.
In the two examples below, we describe the discontinuity design based
on eligibility cut-offs when the cut-off is not known to the public. In these
examples, Type 4 units may exist as there may be some “exceptional” sub-
group that would be treated regardless of the raw values of the running
variable X∗.
Eligibility manipulation for cash transfer eligibility
Manacorda et al. (2011) study the impact of a cash transfer program on
political views for the running government. Using the eligibility threshold of
the cash transfer, they apply an RDD to evaluate the effect on the political
support for the government in Uruguay.
The eligibility criterion is determined by the income level; however, the
actual income is not known. A household survey was conducted by a group
of researchers, including one of the authors, before the implementation of
the policy. The government used the predicted income score based on a
probit prediction of the indicator of being below a critical per capita income
based on the survey results. Therefore, the eligibility cut-off is determined
after collecting the determinants, and households do not know their own
scores X∗ nor the cut-off at the time of the survey. As a result, households
attempting to manipulate the eligibility status directly or indirectly cannot
sort themselves around the cut-off. Thus, we may conclude that there should
not be unit sorting in this context, and we argue that the units are either
Type 1 or Type 4. In addition, manipulating the poverty score is very hard
because the authors made extensive efforts to keep the formula unknown
(except for the Minister and its high-level staff).
One option is to argue that only Type 1 or Type 0 units exist because of
their rigorous compliance. In that case, a joint test of the smooth density
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and balanced covariates would serve as a robustness check of the necessary
conditions for the restrictions in manipulation-robust RDDs.
However, one may still wish to run the density test for smooth density
as a sufficient condition for the HTV condition. For the sufficiency purpose,
we need to identify the possible source of violation of the absence of precise
manipulation (Assumption 2.4). An unlikely possibility of manipulation in
this study is the direct manipulation of the score, so that some units are
treated regardless of the survey. For example, “homeless” households are
recognized as an exception and are safely excluded from the study’s sam-
ple. If the officials have a secret policy that alters the assignment scores
without informing the researchers, then, such “exception rule” may violate
Assumption 2.4. Therefore, one must verify that the exception rule only
occurs in one direction.
Grade Point Average (GPA) manipulation for college admission
Kirkeboen et al. (2016) exploit discontinuities in the admission cut-off
to institutions and fields of study in the Norwegian postsecondary educa-
tion system. Norway’s postsecondary admission process takes the form of a
strategic-proof allocation mechanism called serial dictatorship (c.f. Svens-
son, 1999) based on the admission scores calculated using high school GPAs.
The construction and the matching mechanism allow little room for the
manipulation of scores. While the scores X∗ are known to applicants, the
cut-off is not known a priori, and therefore, the measures to manipulate the
scores are limited. 6 Thus, we may argue that the units are most likely Type
1.
However, similar concerns about the violation of Assumption 2.4 would
apply to this example because teachers might know by experience that some
6Students cannot add courses to alter their GPA but are allowed to remove courses
from the score.
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unpopular field of study in a preferred institution is easier to access by
taking high scores for particular courses. Then, manipulating the grades
in those courses would surely imply the admission of a student to that
field in the desired institution. Such background knowledge would generate
Type 4 units, and discontinuity in the running variable might occur. Such
a “hidden rule” concern in the admission process should be one-sided in
terms of incentives so that the precise manipulation should be one-sided
(Assumption 2.6). Therefore, we may use the density test as a robustness
check for point-identification.
3.3. Examples without knowing X∗, voting examples
Voting examples are frequent setups for the applications of RDDs, in-
cluding Lee (2008). While it is considered a clean environment for the local
randomization, Caughey and Sekhon (2011) argues that the McCrary (2008)
density test and the covariate balancing test might fail.
Voting examples fall into the category of the unknown X∗ or cut-off;
therefore, most elections are considered Type 1 units. However, one must
nevertheless address the possible violation of the absence of precise manip-
ulation (Assumption 2.4). Moreover, we argue that the justification of the
one-sided precise manipulation (Assumption 2.6) is trickier than in the ex-
amples described in the previous section. The primary reason is that the
vote share margin is, by construction, the result of two opposing forces in
the electoral competition.
In the following subsections, we describe three voting examples. Below,
we describe an example of Dell (2015) with elections in the presence of a
violence group, which has an incentive to directly or indirectly affect the
voting results.
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Vote margin for the conservative party against a violence group
Dell (2015) study the effect of conservative National Action Party (PAN)
ruling with crackdowns on the rate of drug-related violence in Mexico. Using
the vote margin in elections for PAN mayors against other candidates, the
RDD is applied to estimate the causal effect of PAN party ruling. As is
the case of voting applications, the validity of the RDD is supported by the
fact that the electoral result is uncertain unless it is directly manipulated as
voting fraud. Without a direct voting fraud, neither the candidates nor their
supporters know the potential voting results X∗; therefore, most elections
are Type 1 units.
However, drug traffickers may directly manipulate the vote results or
push voters to revert their votes. Dell (2015) claim that voting fraud is un-
likely in the institutional context and argue that “traffickers were unlikely to
have anticipated how sustained it would be and the role mayors would play,”
(Dell, 2015, p.1754) thus providing a valid justification to claim the absence
of Type 4 units. However, it is difficult to argue that “even though the
traffickers may have manipulated the voting precisely, such precise manip-
ulation should be against PAN mayors,” so that the precise manipulations
satisfies Assumption 2.6. If not, accepting the McCrary (2008) test does
not necessarily support the point-identification validity. This example is a
case of the “exception rule” argument to rationalize the presence of Type
4 units because the criminal organization may have reverted the electoral
result regardless of the raw electoral results that would happen without any
intervention. The voting example nevertheless blurs the justification of As-
sumption 2.6 because there are two opposing forces affecting the vote share
margin by the construction of the election process.
In the other two examples, we consider the voting applications with no
explicit incentives to carry out voting frauds. While the risk of violating
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Assumption 2.4 decreases, the violation may still happen. Even in the pres-
ence of uncertainty regarding the electoral results, the survey may clearly
indicate that some candidates will surely lose without additional efforts. If
some candidates have strong external support that can revert a certainly
lost election into a certainly won election, Assumption 2.4 may not ap-
ply. If one wishes to run the density test to eliminate such a possibility, it
must be verified that such strong support is available only in one direction.
This justification of Assumption 2.6 is complicated in the electoral context
because, by construction, both candidates have incentives to manipulate in
opposite directions. Therefore, one must argue that the capability of precise
manipulation is limited to a single direction in the running variable.
Vote margin for continuing mayor
Coviello and Gagliarducci (2017) consider the effect of the longer tenure
of politicians in office on the public procurement outcomes using Italian
municipal government data. They use the vote margin for incumbent mayors
to investigate the effect of re-election by adding one more mandate on the
procurement outcomes.
Voting RDDs rationalize the HTV condition by arguing that the electoral
results are uncertain at the pivotal votes, and therefore, most elections are
Type 1 units. However, considering possible violations to Assumption 2.4,
there may be a subset of elections in which one side of candidates has a
strong support, which may lead them to surely win the election by conduct-
ing a strong campaign. Such force is unlikely to generate discontinuity for
already close elections such that X∗ is around the cut-off because no one
knows which sides are “closely” winning without manipulation. However,
an incumbent mayor may notice that it is hardly winning without addi-
tional campaigns but is still capable of exploiting enough political resources
to revert the surely losing election into a surely winning election. Such a
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possibility would generate units violating Assumption 2.4 while maintaining
Assumption 2.5. To validate the density test, we must argue that these units
are Type 4. In other words, the precise manipulation should be only possible
from one side of the campaign but not from both. If the incumbent margin
is considered non-negative, we may argue that precise manipulation should
arise only from a subset of incumbent mayors but not from new candidates,
and we may argue that only Type 1 or Type 4 units exist.
In the empirical application reported in Section 6, we address a famous in-
cumbency margin study in the U.S. House of Representatives of Lee (2008),
followed by a critique of Caughey and Sekhon (2011). As we discuss in the
application section, the original definition of the running variable as the
Democrats vote share margin might not fit our manipulation-robust RDD,
as pointed out by Caughey and Sekhon (2011). As precise manipulation
might occur both from the Democrats and the Republicans, in the original
definition, there may be violations to Assumption 2.4 in both directions
in favor of two parties. With the alternative definition of the incumbents’
margin, as introduced in Caughey and Sekhon (2011), we may argue that
only Type 1 and Type 4 units exist in the electoral results, as in the analog
arguments described above.
Vote margin of unionization elections
Bradley et al. (2017) consider the impact of within-firm voting for union-
ization on innovation measures.
It is difficult to determine a justification for the one-sided precise manipu-
lation (Assumption 2.6) in this case. Workers in favor of unionization might
be organized in a strong movement, knowing that unionization is likely to
be rejected. Managers may also be against unionization interfere to prevent
unionization, knowing that it is likely to occur. Therefore, precise manip-
ulation may occur in both directions so that Assumption 2.6 fails for the
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units violating Assumption 2.4. As a result, one may not use the McCrary
(2008) test for the robustness check without further justification because
the absence of discontinuity may depend on the offsetting of the precise
manipulations in both directions.
One solution to this problem is to exploit background information on
each voting example. For instance, splitting the sample by identifying firms
with no manager interference based on observed firm characteristics, we
may restrict each subsample to only contain Type 1 and Type 4 units, thus
allowing precise manipulation in one direction.
4. PARTIAL IDENTIFICATION RESULTS
Lemma 2.1 implies that the HTV condition holds for Type 0 or Type
1 units. The main result of Theorem 2.1 shows that the HTV condition
also holds when the density function of X generated by Types 0–4 units
is smooth. However, we may reject the null hypothesis that the density
function is smooth. In this case, the useful expressions for E[Y (d)|X = c+]
and E[Y (d)|X = c−] in Lemmas 2.2–2.4 provide partial identification of
the parameters of interest.
Theorem 4.1 (The bound for Type 2 units) We define θ0 ≡ E[Y (1) −
Y (0)|X∗ = c], µ+ ≡ E[Y |X = c+], µ− ≡ E[Y |X = c−] and r ≡ fX(c−)/fX(c+).
Suppose that the assumptions of Lemma 2.2 hold. If Y (0) and Y (1) are
bounded below by yL and above by yU ,
7, we obtain:
θ ≤ θ0 ≤ θ,
7Note that the bound on the random variable is stronger than necessary, as we only
require that the conditional expectation of the potential outcomes are bounded. However,
we use this expression for simplicity.
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where
θ ≡ min{(µ+ − yU)− r (µ− − yU) , r−1 (µ+ − yU)− (µ− − yU)} ,
θ ≡ max{(µ+ − yL)− r (µ− − yL) , r−1 (µ+ − yL)− (µ− − yL)} .
Proof: The statement directly follows from Lemma 2.2. Q.E.D.
From Lemma 2.2, we obtain fX(c−) ≤ fX(c+), which implies that r ∈
[0, 1]. Furthermore, the difference between θ and θ decreases as r is closer
to one. If fX(x) is continuous at x = c, we obtain r = 1. Hence, if fX(x) is
nearly continuous at x = c, Theorem 4.1 provides the informative bounds
on E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X∗ = c].
For Type 3 and Type 4 units, we obtain similar results if Y (d) is bounded
below and above. Although the target parameter is E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X∗ = c]
for Type 2 units, we use different target parameters for Types 3 and Type 4
units. For Type 3 units, the target parameter becomes E[Y (1)−Y (0)|{X∗ =
c} or {X > X∗, X = c}]. As the second sub-population may contain units
that have X∗ far away from the cut-off, the target parameter for the Type 3
units may be quite different from E[Y (1)−Y (0)|X∗ = c]. For Type 4 units,
the target parameter becomes E[Y (1)−Y (0)|X∗ = c,X = X∗]. This target
parameter is similar to that of Gerard et al. (2020). Similar to Theorem 4.1,
for Types 3 and 4 units, we obtain the bounds on E[Y (1) − Y (0)|{X∗ =
c} or {X > X∗, X = c}] and E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X∗ = c,X = X∗], respectively.
Theorem 4.2 (The bound for Type 3 units) Suppose that the assumptions
of Lemma 2.3 hold. If Y (0) and Y (1) are bounded below by yL and above by
yU , we obtain
(µ+ − yU)− r (µ− − yU)
≤ E[Y (1)− Y (0)|{X∗ = c} or {X > X∗, X = c}]
≤ (µ+ − yL)− r (µ− − yL) .
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Proof: This statement directly follows from Lemma 2.3. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.3 (The bounds for Type 4 units) Suppose that the assump-
tions of Lemma 2.4 hold. If Y (0) and Y (1) are bounded below by yL and
above by yU , we obtain
r−1 (µ+ − yU)− (µ− − yU)
≤ E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X∗ = c,X = X∗]
≤ r−1 (µ+ − yL)− (µ− − yL) .
Proof: This statement directly follows from Lemma 2.4. Q.E.D.
All three bounds in Types 2, 3, or 4 units become tighter as r is closer to
one. Furthermore, for each case, the lower and upper bounds are identical
when r = 1.
Combining these results, we obtain a bound for the mixed types of units
as in Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 4.4 (The bound for mixed types of units) Let θ0 ≡ E[Y (1) −
Y (0)|X∗ = c, T = 0], θ1 ≡ E[Y (1) − Y (0)|X∗ = c, T = 1], θ2 ≡ E[Y (1) −
Y (0)|X∗ = c, T = 2], θ3 ≡ E[Y (1) − Y (0)|{X∗ = c}or{X > X∗, X =
c}, T = 3] and θ4 ≡ E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X∗ = c,X = X∗, T = 4].
Let pi0 ≡ fX(c+)P (T = 0|X = c+), pi1 ≡ fX(c+)P (T = 1|X = c+),
pi2 ≡ fX∗(c)P (T = 2|X∗ = c), pi3 ≡ fX(c+)P (T = 3|X = c+), and pi4 ≡
fX(c−)P (T = 4|X = c−). Further let
p˜it ≡ pit
(
∑
t′∈{0,1,2,3,4} pit′)
for every t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. By construction, p˜it ≥ 0 and
∑
t∈{0,1,2,3,4,} p˜it = 1.
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Let
θ˜ ≡
∑
t∈{0,1,2,3,4}
p˜itθt.
Suppose that assumptions for Theorem 2.1 holds, and Y (0) and Y (1) are
bounded below by yL and above by yU . Then, we obtain
min
{
µ+ − yU − r(µ− − yU), r−1(µ+ − yU)− (µ− − yU)
}
≤ θ˜ ≤ max{µ+ − yL − r(µ− − yL), r−1(µ+ − yL)− (µ− − yL)} .
Proof: Proof in Appendix A. Q.E.D.
Remark 4.1 As long as multiple types are nested, we need to rely on
the largest bound of Type 2 units. As we saw in Section 3, many empirical
studies are categorized into either Type 2 and Type 3 units, or Type 4 units.
Therefore, individual bounds in Theorems 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 may be useful.
These bounds are not sharp because yL and yU are not the sharp lower
and upper bounds on E[Y (1)|X = c+, X 6= X∗]. We show the sharp bound
for Type 2 units in the Appendix C. However, this crude bound is easier to
compute, and the corollary in the Appendix C shows that the crude bound
above is sharp when r is close enough to 1.
5. EXTENSIONS
5.1. Fuzzy RDD
All the arguments above apply to a fuzzy RDD. For the exposition pur-
pose, we only focus on the case of Type 2 units only. Our target parameter
can be written as:
ρ0 ≡
ρY
ρD
=
E[Y |X∗ = c+]− E[Y |X∗ = c−]
E[D|X∗ = c+]− E[D|X∗ = c−],
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where ρY ≡ E[Y |X∗ = c+] − E[Y |X∗ = c−] and ρD ≡ E[D|X∗ = c+] −
E[D|X∗ = c−]. It follows from Lemma 2.2 that:
ρY · fX∗(c) = E[Y |X = c+] · fX(c+)− E[Y |X = c−] · fX(c−)
−{fX(c+)− fX∗(c)} · E[Y |X = c+, X 6= X∗]
+ {fX(c−)− fX∗(c)} · E[Y |X∗ = c−, X 6= X∗],
ρD · fX∗(c) = E[D|X = c+] · fX(c+)− E[D|X = c−] · fX(c−)
−{fX(c+)− fX∗(c)} · E[D|X = c+, X 6= X∗]
+ {fX(c−)− fX∗(c)} · E[D|X∗ = c−, X 6= X∗].
Since fX∗(c) is contained in [fX(c−), fX(c+)], we obtain the following lower
and upper bounds on ρY · fX∗(c):
RY ≡ fX(c+) · (µ+ − yU)− fX(c−) · (µ− − yU) ≤ ρY · fX∗(c)
≤ RY ≡ fX(c+) · (µ+ − yL)− fX(c−) · (µ− − yL) .
Similarly, we obtain RD ≤ ρD · fX∗(c) ≤ RD, where RD ≡ fX(c+) ·
(E[D|X = c+]− 1) − fX(c−) · (E[D|X = c−]− 1) and RD ≡ fX(c+) ·
(E[D|X = c+]− 0)−fX(c−) · (E[D|X = c−]− 0) for the binary treatment
status D.
Next, we derive the bounds on ρ0 using the above bounds on ρY · fX∗(c)
and ρD · fX∗(c). If the bounds on ρD · fX∗(c) include zero, then we cannot
obtain informative bounds on ρ0. Hence, we assume RD > 0. Then, we
obtain the following bounds on ρ0:
min
{
RY
RD
,
RY
RD
}
≤ ρ0 ≤ max
{
RY
RD
,
RY
RD
}
.
5.2. Using covariates with exclusion restrictions
In some cases, we can use covariates to tighten the bounds on θ0. We
assume that there exists a vector of covariates,W , that satisfies the following
assumption:
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Assumption 5.1 Let W be the support of W . For any w ∈ W and d ∈
{0, 1}, we obtain:
E[Y (d)|X∗ = c,W = w] = E[Y (d)|X∗ = c].
This is an exclusion restriction. If W is independent of (Y (0), Y (1), X∗),
then Assumption 5.1 holds. Hence, if W only affects the probability of the
manipulation, then W satisfies this assumption.
Theorem 5.1 Let θ(w) and θ(w) be the counterparts of θ and θ conditional
on W = w, respectively. We assume that the assumptions of Theorem 4.1
hold, conditional on W . Then, under Assumption 5.1, we obtain
max
w∈W
{θ(w)} ≤ θ0 ≤ min
w∈W
{
θ(w)
}
.
Proof: Under the assumptions stated, for every value of w in the support
of W , there is a Type 2 unit bound [θ(w), θ¯(w)] from Theorem 4.1 such that
θ(w) ≤ E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X∗ = c] ≤ θ¯(w).
Hence, by taking the minimum and maximum, we obtain the desired result.
Q.E.D.
6. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION: THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTIONS
We apply the proposed identification result to the famous application of
the incumbency advantage of the U.S. House of Representative elections. In
line with the influential study of Lee (2008), Caughey and Sekhon (2011)
argue that the running variable of the “Democratic candidate’s vote share
margin” is not an appropriate running variable. The argument is that the
Democratic candidate’s vote share margin tends to be positive when the
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Democratic party was previously incumbent, and the Democratic candi-
date’s vote share margin tends to be negative when the Republican party
was previously incumbent. Therefore, there may be a discontinuity when
we consider the “incumbent’s vote share margin” as the running variable.
However, the discontinuity disappears in Lee (2008), as tested later by Mc-
Crary (2008), because the past-incumbency effects cancel out when we use
the “Democratic candidate’s vote share margin”
Note that this is a typical voting application, as described in Section
3.3. Every unit (election result) should have no unit sorting (satisfying As-
sumption 2.5). However, there might be some unit violating the “no precise
manipulation” assumption. Therefore, we need to assume that the only pos-
sible precise manipulation in the House of Representative elections should
be from one side if such precise manipulations exist. The arguments of
Caughey and Sekhon (2011) are in line with our manipulation-robust RDD
because both the Democrats and the Republicans may have some power
to violate the no precise manipulation assumption in opposite directions.
The original definition of the Democrats’ vote share margin as the running
variable does not fit our manipulation-robust RDD, and the discontinuity
test is not valid. However, the incumbent share margin in the idea of the
Caughey and Sekhon (2011)’s modification might validate the restrictions
of manipulation-robust RDD if the incumbents are the only candidates who
may have an extremely precise manipulation, as the Type 4 units.
Given the alternative definition of the running variable, Caughey and
Sekhon (2011) document a possible discontinuity at zero with 0.5% width
histogram plots. Figure 6.1 shows our replication of Caughey and Sekhon
(2011).
We may formally test the null hypothesis that the density is smooth
at the cut-off of 0. Using the estimator of Cattaneo et al. (2019), we find
evidence of the (dis)continuity given the optimal bandwidth selection with
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Figure 6.1.— Replicated histogram plot of Caughey and Sekhon (2011,
Figure 1), with 0.5% bin.
a local linear density analog. 8 Figure 6.2 shows the result of the density
test using the local linear estimates using Cattaneo et al. (2019). There may
be a positive jump at the cut-off, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of the smooth density at the cut-off.
To further confirm this finding, we apply our partial identification result
to this example. Given the earlier discussion, the manipulation is carried out
by Type 4 units, and neither Type 2 nor Type 3 units exist. Therefore, we
may use the bound in Theorem 4.3. Table 6.1 shows the empirical results.
In all specifications, the identified sets cover the point-identified values, the
identified set does not include zero, and we conclude that the incumbency
margin is positive.
Table 6.1 indicates three estimation results obtained from different order
of local-polynomial estimates of the density function and the conditional
8The density is estimated based on the first derivative of the local quadratic estimate
of the cumulative distribution function estimate.
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Figure 6.2.— Density plot from Cattaneo, Jensen, and Ma (2019), local
linear density
expectation function using Calonico et al. (2014) and Cattaneo et al. (2019).
9 We construct the bootstrap standard errors for the estimators, and we
compute the 95% confidence intervals (CI) following Imbens and Manski
(2004). The confidence intervals are constructed in two ways. First, we fix
the r estimate as the common value at each bootstrap draw. Second, we
re-estimate r for each bootstrap draw.
The first column (1) in Table 6.1 reports the constant local estimates,
column (2) shows the local linear estimates, and column (3) reports the
local quadratic estimates. Since the constant local estimate and higher-order
local-polynomial estimate are known to be ill-behaved at the boundary,
we prefer the specification in column (2). All three identified sets indicate
the positive effect of incumbency. Furthermore, all the 95% CI constructed
with fixed r statistic estimate show the positive and significant effect of
9The local-polynomial based density estimation of Cattaneo et al. (2019) fits the cu-
mulative distribution function with a local polynomial of order p. The corresponding
density estimate is equal to the local-polynomial estimate of the order p− 1.
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(1) (2) (3)
Order Constant Linear Quadratic
Discontinuity test t 3.197 1.286 0.573
Discontinuity test p 0.001 0.199 0.567
r statistic 0.421 0.792 0.907
bandwidths {1.75,2.12} {9.90,14.06} {23.61,27.07}
Point estimate 0.447 0.434 0.454
SE (0.049) (0.052) (0.064)
Identified set [0.133,1.0] [0.363,0.627] [0.417,0.519]
95% CI, fixed r [0.014,1.000] [0.286,0.704] [0.320,0.616]
95% CI, random r [-0.217,1.000] [0.225,0.908] [0.296,0.738]
TABLE 6.1
Estimation results using three different orders of local polynomials.
incumbency. When we allow for r to vary in their bootstrap draws, the
result in column (1) becomes not stable, and the results in columns (2)
and (3) stay significant. Overall, we conclude that the original conclusion
regarding the incumbency margin in Lee (2008) is robust even though there
might be a slight bias due to manipulation.
However, the results in column (1) indicate that our crude estimation
procedure involves a challenge when the density estimation is not stable.
Therefore, it implies the non-trivial problem of finding the “optimal” band-
widths involving the ratio of the densities at the boundary and its inverse.
As this study focuses on diagnostic tests and partial identification, this in-
ference issue is beyond its scope.
7. CONCLUSION
In this study, we introduce a robust procedure for detecting manipulation
in the RDDs, a manipulation-robust RDD. The proposed design character-
izes a class of “detectable” manipulations over “locally” randomized running
variables. Manipulation-robust RDDs offer a simple and intuitive device to
assess whether the point-identification restrictions are testable using the
observed density of the running variable.
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Our key findings are against the conventional informal wisdom regarding
point-identification in the presence of manipulation and the validity of the
density test. First, the “absence of precise manipulation” does not allow us
to conclude that manipulation does not generate bias. Sorting around the
cut-off may occur through the units’ selective manipulation of their run-
ning variables in the absence of precise manipulation. To our knowledge, no
previous studies show that the sorting behavior may occur not only due to
precise manipulation into the treated group around the cut-off, but also ma-
nipulation to exit from the control group around the cut-off. While accessing
the local neighborhood of the cut-off requires precise control of the extent
of the manipulation, exit from the local neighborhood of the cut-off does
not require such precise control. Therefore, the absence of precise control
of the manipulation is not enough to justify the HTV condition. Since we
provide a formal justification to the previously informal argument, applied
researchers may employ the existing institutional background, such as “un-
known X∗ or the cut-off,” to formally validate their RDDs. For example,
applied researchers may argue that the units cannot precisely control X to
exceed the cut-off, and units cannot precisely exit the local neighborhood
when the distance to the cut-off is unknown.
Second, the monotonicity of the extent of manipulation is neither suffi-
cient nor necessary to assure the validity of the density test because some
types of units require a stronger assumption than monotonicity to be de-
tectable, while other types of units do not require monotonicity to be de-
tectable or harmless. Since our manipulation-robust RDD accepts the mix
of different types of units in the data generating process, monotonicity does
not offer a formal justification for the density test.
We demonstrate the use of the manipulation-robust RDD in various con-
texts by discussing case studies using the McCrary (2008) test as a robust-
ness check for the point-identification restrictions. The proposed case studies
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confirm the use of the density test to assure the HTV condition; however,
various scenarios exist for applied researchers, which require to verify the use
of the institutional background. In particular, the knowledge of the running
variable and the cut-off is critical for assessing a manipulation-robust RDD.
We argue that the procedure to assess the restrictions of the manipulation-
robust RDD is straightforward since many empirical studies detail these
information structures on the running variable and the cut-off, as we find in
our extensive survey. The proposed case studies further suggest a warning
on electoral applications of the RDDs that use the vote share margin as
the running variable. Unlike the notion that the voting example is a clean
RDD environment, detecting the underlying manipulation involves a com-
plication because the electoral outcome is a consequence of two opposing
forces, while we need to detect precise manipulations that only happen in
one direction.
Furthermore, we demonstrate three different partial identification results
within the manipulation-robust RDD. The three bounds differ by the un-
derlying “types” of units in each RDD, while the types are determined in
the procedure to assess whether the RDD in hand accommodates the re-
strictions of the manipulation-robust RDD. We apply the proposed bound
to a controversy over the U.S. House of Representatives election study on
the incumbency margin and conclude that the result of Lee (2008) holds.
Various issues are left unanswered in this study. As we limit our focus
to continuous running variables, we exclude point-masses and discretely-
measured running variables. The identification problems and testability is-
sues for these general contexts are potential directions for future research.
The optimal inference of the partially-identified bounds involves non-trivial
issues because we need to estimate the ratio of the density functions at
boundary points, and we reserve these inference issues for future works.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof for Lemma 2.1: First, we show that fX(x) is continuous at x =
c. We observe that
fX(x) = fX∗|X=X∗(x) · P (X = X∗) + fX|X 6=X∗(x) · P (X 6= X∗)
= fX∗|X=X∗(x) · P (X = X∗)
+
∫
fX|X∗,X 6=X∗(x|x∗)fX∗|X 6=X∗(x∗)dx∗ · P (X 6= X∗),
where the second term is continuous in x from Assumption 2.4. It follows
from Bayes’ rule that we have
fX∗|X=X∗(x) · P (X = X∗) = P (X = X∗|X∗ = x) · fX∗(x).
Because fX∗(x) is continuous in x at c from Assumption 2.2, and P (X =
X∗|X∗ = x) is also continuous in x at c from Assumption 2.5, we obtain
the continuity of fX(x) in x at c.
Next, we show that E[Y (d)|X = x] is continuous at x = c. We observe
that
E[Y (d)|X = x]
= E[Y (d)|X = x,X = X∗] · P (X = X∗|X = x)
+E[Y (d)|X = x,X 6= X∗] · P (X 6= X∗|X = x)
= E[Y (d)|X∗ = x,X = X∗] · P (X = X∗|X = x)
+E[Y (d)|X = x,X 6= X∗] · P (X 6= X∗|X = x),
where E[Y (d)|X = x,X 6= X∗] and E[Y (d)|X∗ = x,X = X∗] are continu-
ous in x at c from Assumptions 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. Using Bayes’ rule,
47
we obtain
P (X = X∗|X = x) = fX|X=X∗(x) · P (X = X
∗)
fX(x)
=
fX∗|X=X∗(x) · P (X = X∗)
fX(x)
,
which implies that P (X = X∗|X = x) is continuous at x = c. Hence,
E[Y (d)|X = x] is continuous at x = c. Q.E.D.
Before giving the proofs of Lemma 2.2, we show that the fraction of
manipulating units at the local to the cut-off can be written in terms of the
fractions of the density functions:
Lemma A.1 Under Assumptions of Lemma 2.2, we have fX∗(x) ≥ fX(x)
for x < c and fX∗(x) ≤ fX(x) for x > c. Furthermore, we obtain
P (X 6= X∗|X = c+) = 1− fX∗(c)
fX(c+)
,
P (X 6= X∗|X∗ = c−) = 1− fX(c−)
fX∗(c)
.
Proof: From Assumption 2.7, for x > c and δ > 0, we obtain
P (X 6= X∗, x ≤ X ≤ x+ δ)
= P (c ≤ X ≤ c+ δ)− P (X = X∗, x ≤ X ≤ x+ δ)
= P (x ≤ X ≤ x+ δ)− P (X = X∗, x ≤ X∗ ≤ x+ δ)
= P (x ≤ X ≤ x+ δ)− P (x ≤ X∗ ≤ x+ δ)
=
∫ x+δ
x
{fX(x˜)− fX∗(x˜)} dx˜,
which implies that fX∗(x) ≤ fX(x) for x > c. Similarly, for x < c and δ > 0,
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we obtain
P (X 6= X∗, x− δ ≤ X∗ ≤ x)
= P (x− δ ≤ X∗ < x)− P (X = X∗, x− δ ≤ X∗ < x)
= P (x− δ ≤ X∗ < x)− P (X = X∗, x− δ ≤ X < x)
= P (c− δ ≤ X∗ < c)− P (c− δ ≤ X < c)
=
∫ x
x−δ
{fX∗(x˜)− fX(x˜)} dx˜,
where the third equality follows from Assumption 2.7. Hence, we obtain
fX∗(x) ≥ fX(x) for x < c.
From above arguments, for any δ > 0, we have
P (X 6= X∗|c ≤ X ≤ c+ δ) = 1− P (c ≤ X
∗ ≤ c+ δ)
P (c ≤ X ≤ c+ δ) ,
which implies P (X 6= X∗|X = c+) = 1 − fX∗ (c)
fX(c+)
. Similarly, we obtain
P (X 6= X∗|X∗ = c−) = 1− fX(c−)
fX∗ (c)
. Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma 2.2: First, we prove (2.1). We observe that
E[Y (d)|X = x]
= E[Y (d)|X = x,X = X∗] · P (X = X∗|X = x)
+E[Y (d)|X = x,X > X∗] · P (X > X∗|X = x)
= E[Y (d)|X∗ = x,X = X∗] · fX∗|X=X∗ (x)·P (X=X∗)
fX(x)
+E[Y (d)|X = x,X > X∗] · P (X > X∗|X = x)
= E[Y (d)|X∗ = x,X = X∗] · P (X=X∗|X∗=x)·fX∗ (x)
fX(x)
+E[Y (d)|X = x,X > X∗] · P (X > X∗|X = x).
Assumption 2.7 implies that P (X = X∗|X∗ = x∗) = 1 for x∗ ≥ c. This
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implies that
E[Y (d)|X = c+] = fX∗(c)
fX(c+)
· E[Y (d)|X∗ = c+, X = X∗]
+
fX(c+)− fX∗(c)
fX(c+)
· E[Y (d)|X = c+, X > X∗],
where fX∗(c)/fX(c+) = P (X = X
∗|X = c+) and hence fX∗(c) ≤ fX(c)
from Lemma A.1. Because we have E[Y (d)|X∗ = c] = E[Y (d)|X∗ = c+] =
E[Y (d)|X∗ = c+, X = X∗] form Assumptions 2.2 and 2.7, we obtain (2.1).
Next, we prove (2.2). We observe that
E[Y (d)|X∗ = x∗] = E[Y (d)|X∗ = x∗, X = X∗] · P (X = X∗|X∗ = x∗)
+E[Y (d)|X∗ = x∗, X > X∗] · P (X > X∗|X∗ = x∗)
= E[Y (d)|X = x∗, X = X∗] · fX|X=X∗(x) · P (X = X
∗)
fX∗(x∗)
+E[Y (d)|X∗ = x∗, X > X∗] · P (X > X∗|X∗ = x∗).
= E[Y (d)|X = x∗, X = X∗] · P (X = X
∗|X = x)fX(x)
fX∗(x∗)
+E[Y (d)|X∗ = x∗, X > X∗] · P (X > X∗|X∗ = x∗).
From Assumption 2.6, we have X < c ⇒ X = X∗. Hence, we obtain
E[Y (d)|X∗ = c] = E[Y (d)|X = c−, X = X∗] · fX(c−)
fX∗(c)
+E[Y (d)|X∗ = c−, X > X∗] · fX∗(c)− fX(c−)
fX∗(c)
,
where fX(c−)/fX∗(c) = P (X = X∗|X∗ = c−) and hence fX∗(c) ≥ fX(c−)
from Lemma A.1. Because we have E[Y (d)|X = c−] = E[Y (d)|X =
c−, X = X∗] form Assumption 2.6, we obtain (2.2). Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma 2.3: We define g(x) ≡ E[Y (d)|{X∗ = x} or {X 6=
X∗, X = x}]. We show that g(x) is continuous at x = c. From Assumption
2.8, events {X∗ ∈ (x − δ, x + δ)} and {X 6= X∗, X ∈ (x − δ, x + δ)} are
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exclusive for 0 < δ < /2. Hence, we obtain
g(x) = E[Y (d)|X∗ = x] ·
(
fX∗(x)
h(x)
)
+E[Y (d)|X = x,X 6= X∗] ·
(
fX|X 6=X∗(x)P (X 6= X∗)
h(x)
)
,
where h(x) ≡ fX∗(x) + fX|X 6=X∗(x)P (X 6= X∗). It follows from Assumption
2.4 that E[Y (d)|X = x,X 6= X∗] and fX|X 6=X∗(x) are continuous at x =
c. Because E[Y (d)|X∗ = x] and fX∗(x) are continuous at x = c, g(x) is
continuous at x = c.
We observe that
g(x) = E[Y (d)|{X = x} or {X 6= X∗, X∗ = x}].
Similar to the above argument, g(x) can be written as
g(x) = E[Y (d)|X = x] · fX(x)
(fX(x) + fX∗|X 6=X∗(x)P (X 6= X∗))
+E[Y (d)|X∗ = x,X 6= X∗] · fX∗|X 6=X∗(x)P (X 6= X
∗)
(fX(x) + fX∗|X 6=X∗(x)P (X 6= X∗)) .
Because fX|X=X∗(x) = fX∗|X=X∗(x), we obtain
h(x) = fX(x) + fX∗|X 6=X∗(x)P (X 6= X∗),
which implies h(x) ≥ fX(x). It follows from Assumption 2.7 that we have
fX∗|X 6=X∗(x) = 0 for x ≥ c. This implies that
E[Y (d)|{X∗ = c} or {X 6= X∗, X = c}] = E[Y (d)|X = c+].
Because h(x) is continuous at x = c, we have h(c) = fX(c+). Hence, we
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obtain
g(c) = E[Y (d)|X = c−] ·
(
fX(c−)
fX(c+)
)
+E[Y (d)|X∗ = c−, X 6= X∗] ·
(
fX(c+)− fX(c−)
fX(c+)
)
.
In addition, we have fX(c−) ≤ fX(c+). Therefore, we obtain the desired
result. Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma 2.4: Similar to the proof of Lemma 2.1, we obtain
the continuity of fX∗|X=X∗(x) and E[Y (d)|X∗ = x,X = X∗]. Because we
have X < c ⇒ X = X∗ from Assumption 2.6, we obtain
E[Y (d)|X = c−] = E[Y (d)|X∗ = c−, X = X∗]
= E[Y (d)|X∗ = c,X = X∗].
Similar to the proof of Lemma 2.2, we obtain
E[Y (d)|X = c+] = E[Y (d)|X∗ = c,X = X∗] · P (X = X∗|X = c+)
+E[Y (d)|X = c+, X 6= X∗] · P (X 6= X∗|X = c+).
For any x ≥ c, we observe that
P (X = X∗|X = x) = fX∗|X=X∗(x) · P (X = X
∗)
fX(x)
.
Because we have fX|X 6=X∗(c−) = 0, we have fX(c−) = fX∗|X=X∗(c) ·P (X =
X∗). This implies that we have P (X = X∗|X = c+) = fX(c−)/fX(c+) and
hence we obtain the desired result. Q.E.D.
Proof for Theorem 4.4: Let µ+t ≡ E[Y |X = c+, T = t] and µ−t ≡
E[Y |X = c−, T = t] for every t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
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From lemma 2.1–2.4,
θ0 =E[Y |X = c+, T = 0]− E[Y |X = c−, T = 0] = µ+0 − µ−0 ,
θ1 =E[Y |X = c+, T = 1]− E[Y |X = c−, T = 1] = µ+1 − µ−1 ,
θ2 =
fX|T=2(c+)
fX∗|T=2(c)
E[Y |X = c+, T = 2]
− fX|T=2(c−)
fX∗|T=2(c)
E[Y |X = c−, T = 2]
−
(
fX|T=2(c+)
fX∗|T=2(c)
− 1
)
E[Y (1)|X = c+, X > X∗, T = 2]
−
(
1− fX|T=2(c−)
fX∗|T=2(c)
)
E[Y (0)|X∗ = c−, X > X∗, T = 2],
≤fX|T=2(c+)
fX∗|T=2(c)
µ+2 −
fX|T=2(c−)
fX∗|T=2(c)
µ−2
−
(
fX|T=2(c+)
fX∗|T=2(c)
− 1
)
yL −
(
1− fX|T=2(c−)
fX∗|T=2(c)
)
yL
=
fX|T=2(c+)
fX∗|T=2(c)
(µ+2 − yL)−
fX|T=2(c−)
fX∗|T=2(c)
(µ−2 − yL),
θ3 =E[Y |X = c+, T = 3]− fX|T=3(c−)
fX|T=3(c+)
E[Y |X = c−, T = 3]
−
(
1− fX|T=3(c−)
fX|T=3(c+)
)
E[Y (0)|X∗ = c−, X > X∗, T = 3],
≤(µ+3 − yL)−
fX|T=3(c−)
fX|T=3(c+)
(µ−3 − yL),
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and
θ4 =
fX|T=4(c+)
fX|T=4(c−)E[Y |X = c+, T = 4]− E[Y |X = c−, T = 4]
−
(
fX|T=4(c+)
fX|T=4(c−) − 1
)
E[Y (1)|X = c+, X 6= X∗, T = 4]
≤fX|T=4(c+)
fX|T=4(c−)(µ
+
4 − yL)− (µ−4 − yL).
Note that the Bayes’ rule implies for each t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4},
fX|T=t(c+)P (T = t)
fX∗|T=t(c)P (T = t)
=
P (T = t|X = c+)fX(c+)
P (T = t|X∗ = c)fX∗(c) ,
fX|T=t(c−)P (T = t)
fX∗|T=t(c)P (T = t)
=
P (T = t|X = c−)fX(c−)
P (T = t|X∗ = c)fX∗(c) ,
and
fX|T=t(c+)P (T = t)
fX|T=t(c−)P (T = t) =
P (T = t|X = c+)fX(c+)
P (T = t|X = c−)fX(c−) .
Therefore,
θ2 ≤P (T = 2|X = c+)fX(c+)
P (T = 2|X∗ = c)fX∗(c) (µ
+
2 − yL)
− P (T = 2|X = c−)fX(c−)
P (T = 2|X∗ = c)fX∗(c) (µ
−
2 − yL)
=
P (T = 2|X = c+)fX(c+)(µ+2 − yL)
pi2
− P (T = 2|X = c−)fX(c−)(µ
−
2 − yL)
pi2
,
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θ3 ≤P (T = 3|X = c+)fX(c+)
P (T = 3|X = c+)fX(c+)(µ
+
3 − yL)
− P (T = 3|X = c−)fX(c−)
P (T = 3|X = c+)fX(c+)(µ
−
3 − yL)
=
P (T = 3|X = c+)fX(c+)(µ+3 − yL)
pi3
− P (T = 3|X = c−)fX(c−)(µ
−
3 − yL)
pi3
,
and
θ4 ≤P (T = 4|X = c+)fX(c+)
P (T = 4|X = c−)fX(c−)(µ
+
4 − yL)
− P (T = 4|X = c−)fX(c−)
P (T = 4|X = c−)fX(c−)(µ
−
4 − yL)
=
P (T = 4|X = c+)fX(c+)(µ+4 − yL)
pi4
− P (T = 4|X = c−)fX(c−)(µ
−
4 − yL)
pi4
.
Furthermore, by fX|T=1(c−) = fX|T=1(c+) and fX|T=0(c−) = fX|T=0(c+),
θ1 =
fX|T=1(c+)P (T = 1)
fX|T=1(c+)P (T = 1)
µ+1 −
fX|T=1(c−)P (T = 1)
fX|T=1(c−)P (T = 1)µ
−
1
=
fX|T=1(c+)P (T = 1)
fX|T=1(c+)P (T = 1)
µ+1 −
fX|T=1(c−)P (T = 1)
fX|T=1(c+)P (T = 1)
µ−1
=
fX(c+)P (T = 1|X = c+)(µ+1 − yL)
pi1
− fX(c−)P (T = 1|X = c−)(µ
−
1 − yL)
pi1
.
and
θ0 =
fX(c+)P (T = 0|X = c+)(µ+0 − yL)
pi0
− fX(c−)P (T = 0|X = c−)(µ
−
0 − yL)
pi0
.
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Remember that we would like to bound
∑
t
p˜itθt =
∑
t pitθt∑
t′ pit′
.
From the upper bounds for each θt, we obtain
∑
t
pitθt ≤
∑
t
fX(c+)P (T = t|X = c+)(µ+t − yL)
−
∑
t
fX(c−)P (T = t|X = c−)(µ−t − yL)
=fX(c+)(µ
+ − yL)− fX(c−)(µ− − yL)
because
∑
t
P (T = t|X = c+)E[Y |X = c+, T = t] = E[Y |X = c+] ≡ µ+.
Also we obtain
∑
t′
pit′ =fX(c+)P (T ∈ {0, 1,or 3}|X = c+)
+ fX∗(c)P (T = 2|X∗ = c) + fX(c−)P (T = 4|X = c−)
and
fX(c−) ≤
∑
t′
pit′ ≤ fX(c+)
since
fX(c+)P (T = t|X = c+) = fX|T=t(c+)P (T = t)
≥ fX|T=t(c−)P (T = t)
= fX(c−)P (T = t|X = c−),
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fX(c+)P (T = 2|X = c+) = fX|T=2(c+)P (T = 2) ≥ fX∗(c)P (T = 2|X∗ = c)
and
fX∗|T=2(c)P (T = 2) ≥ fX|T=2(c−)P (T = 2) = fX(c−)P (T = 2|X = c−).
As a result,
∑
t p˜itθt =
∑
t pitθt∑
t′ pit′
is bounded above by the max of
fX(c+)(µ
+ − yL)− fX(c−)(µ− − yL)
fX(c+)
= (µ+− yL)− fX(c−)
fX(c+)
(µ−− yL)
and
fX(c+)(µ
+ − yL)− fX(c−)(µ− − yL)
fX(c−) =
fX(c+)
fX(c−)(µ
+− yL)− (µ−− yL)
which equals to the upper bound in Theorem 4.1.
Similar argument shows the lower bound. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL RESTRICTION FOR THE SMOOTHNESS
BEING NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT
In the main text, we propose a set of sufficient conditions that the Mc-
Crary (2008)’s test is valid. However, these conditions are not necessary as
the HTV condition may hold without having the continuous density. Below,
we consider the additional restriction for the density being smooth if and
only if the HTV condition holds.
Proposition B.1 Suppose that Assumptions for Lemma 2.2 hold, and
assume that
E[Y (d)|X = c+, X 6= X∗] < E[Y (d)|X∗ = c] and(B.1)
E[Y (d)|X∗ = c] < E[Y (d)|X∗ = c−, X 6= X∗],
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or
E[Y (d)|X = c+, X 6= X∗] > E[Y (d)|X∗ = c](B.2)
E[Y (d)|X∗ = c] > E[Y (d)|X∗ = c−, X 6= X∗].
Then, E[Y (d)|X = x] is continuous at x = c if and only if fX(x) is contin-
uous at x = c.
Proof: If condition (B.2) holds, it follows from Lemma 2.2 that we have
E[Y (d)|X = c+] ≤ E[Y (d)|X∗ = c],
where the equality holds if and only if fX(c+) = fX∗(c). Similarly, under
condition (B.2), we have
E[Y (d)|X = c−] ≥ E[Y (d)|X∗ = c],
where the equality holds if and only if fX(c−) = fX∗(c). Hence, the con-
tinuity of fX(x) becomes a necessary and sufficient condition of the con-
tinuity of E[Y (d)|X = x]. Similar to (B.2), under (B.3), the continuity
of fX(x) becomes a necessary and sufficient condition of the continuity of
E[Y (d)|X = x]. Q.E.D.
This proposition implies that under (B.2) or (B.3), the continuity of fX(x)
becomes a necessary and sufficient condition of the HTV condition. From
Assumption 2.7, we have
E[Y (d)|X∗ = c+] = E[Y (d)|X∗ = c+, X = X∗]
= E[Y (d)|X = c+, X = X∗].
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Hence, condition (B.2) is equivalent to the following condition:
(B.3)
E[Y (d)|X = c+, X 6= X∗] < E[Y (d)|X = c+, X = X∗] and
E[Y (d)|X∗ = c−, X = X∗] < E[Y (d)|X∗ = c−, X 6= X∗].
APPENDIX C: SHARP BOUND OF THE TARGET PARAMETER
As noted in the main text, the bounds for Theorems 4.1–4.3 are not
sharp. Below, we consider the sharp bound for Theorem 4.1 as an example.
In Appendix D, we illustrate the numerical example demonstrating when the
crude bound of Theorem 4.1 approximates the sharp bound shown below.
First, we show that the sharp bound for fX∗(c) is a closed interval of the
observed densities [fX(c−), fX(c+)].
Lemma C.1 Under Assumptions of Lemma 2.2, the identified set of fX∗
can be written as
A ≡ {f ∈ FC : f(x) ≥ fX(x) for x < c and f(x) ≤ fX(x) for x > c.} ,
where FC is a class of all continuous density functions.
Proof: First observe that the identified set of fX∗ is invariant to the
knowledge of the data of Y . Let F be the identified set of fX∗ given the whole
data (X, Y ) compatible with the Assumptions relevant to (X,X∗), and let
F ′ be the identified set observing only the part of the data X compatible
with the Assumptions. Note that F ⊆ F ′ as we add more information in F .
Therefore, we want to show that the arbitrary fX∗ ∈ F ′ belongs F . In other
words, for any fX∗ ∈ F ′, we may construct the conditional distribution of
Y (d)|X,X∗ which is compatible with the extended data set of (Y,X) and
satisfying the Assumptions.
Given the distribution of X with the marginal distribution of fX , fix
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an arbitrary fX∗ ∈ F ′. Take an arbitrary joint distribution of (X,X∗),
F˜X∗,X , compatible with the marginal distributions fX and fX∗ as well as
the Assumptions relevant to (X,X∗). Now take an arbitrary conditional
distribution of Y |X = x,X∗ = x∗ for each value of x, x∗, denoted by P (Y ≤
y|X = x,X∗ = x∗) as the additional data.
From the extended data, we construct the conditional distributions of the
potential outcomes Y (d). We define
P˜ (Y (0) ≤ y|X = x,X∗ = x∗) ≡
P (Y ≤ y|X = x
∗) if x < c
P (Y ≤ y|X = c−) if x ≥ c
,
using the conditional distributions P (Y ≤ y|X = x) and P (Y ≤ y|X∗ =
x∗) integrated for each x and x∗ respectively using F˜X,X∗ . Let P˜ (Y (0) ≤
y|X = x) be a conditional probability obtained from integrating P˜ (Y (0) ≤
y|X = x,X∗ = x∗) over X∗ using F˜X,X∗ . As we take F˜X,X∗ satisfying the
Assumptions including Assumption 2.6, for x < c, we have
P˜ (Y (0) ≤ y|X = x) =
∫
P˜ (Y (0) ≤ y|X = x,X∗ = x∗)dF˜X∗|X(x∗|x)
= P˜ (Y (0) ≤ y|X = X∗ = x) = P (Y ≤ y|X = x),
where F˜X∗|X is a conditional distribution provided by F˜X,X∗ .
Hence, P˜ (Y (0) ≤ y|X = x) is consistent with the observed probabil-
ity. Let P˜ (Y (0) ≤ y|X∗ = x∗) be a conditional probability provided by
P˜ (Y (0) ≤ y|X = x,X∗ = x∗) and F˜X,X∗ . Because F˜X,X∗ satisfies Assump-
tion 2.6, for x∗ < c, we have
P˜ (Y (0) ≤ y|X∗ = x∗) =
∫
P˜ (Y (0) ≤ y|X = x,X∗ = x∗)dF˜X|X∗(x|x∗)
= P˜ (Y (0) ≤ y|X = X∗ = x∗)
= P (Y ≤ y|X = x∗).
Therefore, we show that the constructed P˜ (Y (0) ≤ y|X∗ = x∗) is continuous
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in x∗. Similarly, we define
P˜ (Y (1) ≤ y|X = x,X∗ = x∗) ≡
P (Y ≤ y|X = x) if x ≥ cP (Y ≤ y|X = c+) if x < c .
Let P˜ (Y (1) ≤ y|X = x) be a conditional probability provided by P˜ (Y (1) ≤
y|X = x,X∗ = x∗) and F˜X,X∗ . Similar to P˜ (Y (0) ≤ y|X = x), P˜ (Y (1) ≤
y|X = x) is consistent with the observed probability. Let P˜ (Y (1) ≤ y|X∗ =
x∗) be a conditional probability provided by P˜ (Y (1) ≤ y|X = x,X∗ = x∗)
and F˜X,X∗ . Because F˜X,X∗ satisfies Assumption 2.7, for x
∗ ≥ c, we have
P˜ (Y (1) ≤ y|X∗ = x∗) =
∫
P˜ (Y (1) ≤ y|X = x,X∗ = x∗)dF˜X|X∗(x|x∗)
= P˜ (Y (1) ≤ y|X = X∗ = x∗)
= P (Y ≤ y|X = x∗),
which implies that P˜ (Y (1) ≤ y|X∗ = x∗) is continuous in x∗. Hence, we
show that P˜ (Y (d) ≤ y|X∗ = x∗) satisfies Assumption 2.2 and is consistent
with the extended observed distribution of (X, Y ). As a result, the fixed
fX∗ also belongs to F .
To show the identified set for the counterfactual density function fX∗(x)
is A, we need to show two statements. First, we need to verify that any den-
sity function fX∗(x) compatible with a joint distribution (X,X
∗) satisfying
Assumptions 1–4 belongs to A. Second, we need to show that any density
function belongs to A is compatible with some joint distribution (X,X∗)
satisfying Assumptions 1–4.
It follows from Lemma A.1 that A includes the identified set of fX∗ . It
suffices to show that for any f˜X∗ ∈ A, there exists a candidate of the joint
distribution of (X,X∗) such that satisfies the Assumptions and yields the
marginal densities, fX(·) and f˜X∗(·). By the definition ofA, f˜X∗(c) is strictly
positive because fX(c−) > 0 from Assumption 2.1 and 2.3. Hence, f˜X∗(·)
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satisfies Assumption 2.1 and 2.3. We define
P˜ (X = X∗|X∗ = x∗) ≡
fX(x
∗)/f˜X∗(x∗) if x∗ ≤ c
1 if x∗ > c
,(C.1)
and for x∗ ≤ c,
f˜X|X∗,X 6=X∗(x|x∗) ≡

0 if x ≤ c
fX(x)−f˜X∗ (x)∫∞
c {fX(x)−f˜X∗ (x)}dx if x > c
.(C.2)
By the definition of A, we have P˜ (X = X∗|X∗ = x∗) ∈ [0, 1] for all x∗ and
f˜X|X∗,X 6=X∗(x|x∗) becomes a density function. Then, using (C.1) and (C.2),
we can construct a candidate of P (X ≤ x|X∗ = x∗) as follows. For x∗ ≤ c,
we obtain
P˜ (X ≤ x|X∗ = x∗) ≡
0 if x < x
∗
˜˜P (x∗) if x∗ ≤ x
,
where
˜˜P (x∗) ≡P˜ (X = X∗|X∗ = x∗)
+ (1− P˜ (X = X∗|X∗ = x∗))×
∫ x
−∞
f˜X|X∗,X 6=X∗(x′|x∗)dx′,
and for x∗ > c, we obtain
P˜ (X ≤ x|X∗ = x∗) ≡
0 if x < x
∗
1 if x ≥ x∗
,
Since we have P˜ (X = X∗|X∗ = x∗) ∈ [0, 1] for all x∗ and f˜X|X∗,X 6=X∗(x|x∗)
is a density function, P˜ (X ≤ x|X∗ = x∗) becomes a distribution func-
tion. Hence, using f˜X∗ , this provides a candidate of the joint distribution of
(X,X∗). It follows from (C.1) and (C.2) that this joint distribution satisfies
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Assumptions 2.6 and 2.7. From (C.1) and (C.2), for x ≤ c, we obtain∫ ∞
−∞
P˜ (X ≤ x|X∗ = x∗)f˜X∗(x∗)dx∗
=
∫ c
−∞
P˜ (X ≤ x|X∗ = x∗)f˜X∗(x∗)dx∗
+
∫ ∞
c
P˜ (X ≤ x|X∗ = x∗)f˜X∗(x∗)dx∗
=
∫ x
−∞
P˜ (X = X∗|X∗ = x∗)f˜X∗(x∗)dx∗ =
∫ x
−∞
fX(x
∗)dx∗.
Similarly, for x > c, we obtain∫ ∞
−∞
P˜ (X ≤ x|X∗ = x∗)f˜X∗(x∗)dx∗
=
∫ c
−∞
P˜ (X ≤ x|X∗ = x∗)f˜X∗(x∗)dx∗
+
∫ x
c
P˜ (X ≤ x|X∗ = x∗)f˜X∗(x∗)dx∗
=
∫ c
−∞
fX(x
∗)dx∗ +
∫ x
c
f˜X∗(x
∗)dx∗
+
∫ c
−∞
(f˜X∗(x
∗)− fX(x∗))dx∗ ×
∫ x
c
{
fX(x
′)− f˜X∗(x′)
}
dx′∫∞
c
{
fX(x′)− f˜X∗(x′)
}
dx′
=
∫ c
−∞
fX(x
∗)dx∗ +
∫ x
c
{
fX(x
′)− f˜X∗(x′)
}
dx′ +
∫ x
c
f˜X∗(x
∗)dx∗
=
∫ x
−∞
fX(x
∗)dx∗,
where the third equality holds because∫ c
−∞
(f˜X∗(x
∗)− fX(x∗))dx∗ =
∫ ∞
c
(fX(x
∗)− f˜X∗(x∗))dx∗.
This implies that P˜ (X ≤ x|X∗ = x∗) and f˜X∗ provide the marginal density
fX(·). Therefore, f˜X∗ is consistent with the observed density fX and it is
contained in the identified set of fX∗ . Q.E.D.
Hence, we obtain the following sharp bounds on θ0:
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Theorem C.1 We define τ(z) ≡ 1− z/fX(c+),
FLz (y) ≡
max
{
0,
FY |X=c+(y)−(1−τ(z))
τ(z)
}
if τ(z) > 0
1{y ≥ yU} if τ(z) = 0
,
FUz (y) ≡
min
{
1,
FY |X=c+(y)
τ(z)
}
if τ(z) > 0
1{y ≥ yL} if τ(z) = 0
,
gL(z) ≡
∫ yU
yL
ydFUz (y), and gU(z) ≡
∫ yU
yL
ydFLz (y).
Under Assumptions of Theorem 4.1, we obtain the following sharp bounds
on θ0:
θS ≤ θ0 ≤ θS,
where θS ≡ minz∈[fX(c−),fX(c+)] ΘL(z), θS ≡ maxz∈[fX(c−),fX(c+)] ΘU(z),
ΘL(z) ≡ fX(c+)
z
· (µ+ − gU(z))− fX(c−)
z
· (µ− − yU) + (gU(z)− yU),
and
ΘU(z) ≡ fX(c+)
z
· (µ+ − gL(z))− fX(c−)
z
· (µ− − yL) + (gL(z)− yL).
Proof: From Lemma 2.2, the identified set of θ0 is determined by three
parameters fX∗(c), E[Y (1)|X = c+, X 6= X∗], and E[Y (0)|X∗ = c−, X 6=
X∗]. First, we construct the sharp bound of θ0 for given value of fX∗(c) = z,
denoted by the bound [ΘL(z),ΘU(z)]. Then we conclude that our bound
[θS, θ¯S] is sharp from the fact that the sharp bound for fX∗(c) is a closed
interval [fX(c−), fX(c+)] from Lemma C.1.
From Lemma A.1, we have
FY |X=c+(y) = FY (1)|X=c+,X 6=X∗(y) · P (X 6= X∗|X = c+)
+FY (1)|X=c+,X=X∗(y) · P (X = X∗|X = c+),
= τ(z) · FY (1)|X=c+,X 6=X∗(y)
+(1− τ(z)) · FY (1)|X=c+,X=X∗(y).
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Therefore, when τ(z) > 0, we have
FY (1)|X=c+,X 6=X∗(y) =
1
τ(z)
FY |X=c+(y)− 1− τ(z)
τ(z)
FY (1)|X=c+,X=X∗(y).
When τ(z) = 0, we have 1{y ≥ yU} ≤ FY (1)|X=c+,X 6=X∗(y) ≤ 1{y ≥
yL} from the bounds of Y (d). Hence, we obtain the following bounds on
FY (1)|X=c+,X 6=X∗(y):
FLz (y) ≤ FY (1)|X=c+,X 6=X∗(y) ≤ FUz (y).
for each value of z. From Horowitz and Manski (1995) and Lee (2009), this
distribution function bound is sharp given the knowledge of fX∗(c) = z
for each z. Finally, we obtain the sharp mean bound gL(z) ≤ E[Y (1)|X =
c+, X 6= X∗] ≤ gU(z) by integrating the sharp bounds for the distributions
above. From Assumption 2.6, we have
FY (0)|X∗=c−,X=X∗(y) = FY (0)|X=c−,X=X∗(y) = FY |X=c−(y).
From Lemma A.1, we have
FY |X∗=c−(y) = FY (0)|X∗=c−,X 6=X∗(y) · P (X 6= X∗|X∗ = c−)
+FY |X=c−(y) · P (X = X∗|X∗ = c−)
= t(z) · FY (0)|X∗=c−,X 6=X∗(y) + (1− t(z)) · FY |X=c−(y),
when fX∗(c) = z, where t(z) ≡ 1− fX(c−)/z. Here we need to replace both
distributions on the right hand side with the worst case bounds because
FY |X∗=c−(y) is not observed unlike the bound for FY (1)|X=c+,X 6=X∗(y). As a
result, the sharp lower and upper bounds on FY (0)|X∗=c−,X 6=X∗(y) are 1{y ≥
yU} and 1{y ≥ yL}, respectively. Hence, given the knowledge of fX∗(c) = z,
the sharp lower and upper bounds on E[Y (0)|X∗ = c−, X 6= X∗] become
yL and yU , respectively,
Combining these sharp bounds for the mean values given the knowledge
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of fX∗(c) = z > 0, we obtain the lower bound
θ0 ≥ 1
z
· (E[Y |X = c+] · fX(c+)− E[Y |X = c−] · fX(c−))
−fX(c+)− z
z
· gU(z) + fX(c−)− z
z
· yU
=
fX(c+)
z
· (E[Y |X = c+]− gU(z))− fX(c−)
z
· (E[Y |X = c−]− yU)
+ (gU(z)− yU) ≡ ΘL(z),
and the upper bound
θ0 ≤ fX(c+)
z
· (E[Y |X = c+]− gL(z))− fX(c−)
z
· (E[Y |X = c−]− yL)
+ (gL(z)− yL) ≡ ΘU(z)
for each value of fX∗(c) = z, and the bound [ΘL(z),ΘU(z)] is sharp for each
z from the earlier arguments.
From Lemma C.1, we know that the identified set of fX∗(c) is the closed
interval of [fX(c−), fX(c+)]. Hence, the sharp lower and upper bounds θS
and θS are the minimum and maximum of each bound over the closed
interval [fX(c−), fX(c+)] as stated in the Lemma.
Q.E.D.
From Assumption 2.7, we have P (X 6= X∗|X = c+) = τ(z) when
fX∗(c) = z. Hence, similar to Horowitz and Manski (1995) and Lee (2009),
the sharp lower and upper bounds on E[Y (1)|X = c+, X 6= X∗] are gL(z)
and gU(z).
If Y is continuously distributed conditional on X = c+, then we have
gL(z) = E[Y |X = c+, Y ≤ QY |X=c+(τ(z))] and gU(z) = E[Y |X = c+, Y ≥
QY |X=c+(1 − τ(z))]. Because fX(c−) ≤ fX∗(c) ≤ fX(c+), τ(z) must be in
[0, 1− fX(c−)/fX(c+)]. Hence, gL(z) and gU(z) can be yL and yU , respec-
tively. This implies that in some cases, the crude bounds of Theorem 4.1
are consistent with the sharp bounds of Theorem C.1.
66
Next, we consider the case in which Y is binary. For τ(z) > 0, we have
gL(z) = max
{
0,
µ+ − (1− τ(z))
τ(z)
}
and gU(z) = min
{
1,
µ+
τ(z)
}
.
This implies the following: gL(z) is 0 and gU(z) is 1 when we have τ(z) ≤
µ+ ≤ (1 − τ(z)) for all z ∈ [fX(c−), fX(c+)]. If we have 1 − r ≤ µ+ ≤ r,
then τ(z) ≤ µ+ ≤ (1− τ(z)) holds for all z ∈ [fX(c−), fX(c+)]. Hence, we
obtain the following result.
Corollary C.1 Under Assumptions of Theorem 4.1, if (yL, yU) is equal
to (0, 1), then θ and θ are consistent with the sharp bounds θS and θS when
r ≥ 0.5 and µ+ ∈ [1− r, r].
If the difference between fX(c−) and fX(c+) is close to zero, then r
becomes close to one. When r is close to one, µ+ ∈ [1− r, r] holds in many
cases. Hence, we can easily compute the sharp bounds on θ0 when Y is
binary and the difference between fX(c−) and fX(c+) is small. In Appendix
D, we demonstrate the performance of the crude bound from Theorem 4.1
in approximating the sharp bound of Theorem C.1.
APPENDIX D: NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION: WHEN THE CRUDE BOUND IS
A GOOD APPROXIMATE OF THE SHARP BOUND
To illustrate our bounds on θ0, we consider the following model:
Y (d) = 1{µd(X∗) ≥ },
N = 1{X∗ ≥ c or U ≥ p},
X = N ·X∗ + (1−N) · V,
where X∗, , U , and V are unobserved variables and mutually independent,
the cut-off value c is zero,  and U are uniformly distributed on (0, 1), X∗ ∼
N(0, 1), and V ≥ 0. We assume that µd : R 7→ [0, 1] is continuous. As seen
in Example 1, we obtain fX(0−) = (1−p)·φ(0) and fX(0+) = φ(0)+0.5λ·p.
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From Lemma 2.2, we obtain
E[Y (d)|X = 0+] = φ(0)
φ(0) + 0.5λ · p × µd(0)
+
0.5λ · p
φ(0) + 0.5λ · p × P ( ≤ µd(X
∗)|X = 0+, N = 0)
=
φ(0)
φ(0) + 0.5λ · p × µd(0)
+
0.5λ · p
φ(0) + 0.5λ · p × P ( ≤ µd(X
∗)|X∗ < 0)
=
φ(0)
φ(0) + 0.5λ · p × µd(0)
+
0.5λ · p
φ(0) + 0.5λ · p × 2
∫ 0
−∞
µd(x)φ(x)dx,
where the second equality follows because we have P ( ≤ µd(X∗)|X =
0+, N = 0) = P ( ≤ µd(X∗)|V = 0, X∗ < 0, U < p) = P ( ≤ µd(X∗)|X∗ <
0). In addition, from Assumption 2, we obtain
E[Y (d)|X = 0−] = E[Y (d)|X∗ = 0−, N = 1]
= P ( ≤ µd(0)|X∗ = 0−, N = 1) = µd(0),
where the last equality follows because  is independent of X∗ and U .
Next, we calculate the bounds of Theorems 4.1 and C.1. We assume
that µ0(x) = Φ(x − 1) and µ1(x) = Φ(x − 0.5), where Φ(·) is the stan-
dard normal distribution function. From numerical calculation, we obtain
θ0 ≡ E[Y (1) − Y (0)|X∗ = 0] = 0.150, r ≡ fX(c−)/fX(c+) = (1 − p) ·
φ(0)/(φ(0)+0.5λ·p), and τ(z) ≡ 1−z/fX(c+) = 1−z/(φ(0)+0.5λ·p). Given
p and λ, we can calculate µ+ ≡ E[Y |X = 0+] and µ− ≡ E[Y |X = 0−] from
above discussion. Table D.2 shows bounds of Theorem 4.1 and Corollary C.1
for p = 0.1, 0.3 and λ = 0.05, 0.3. This implies that as p and λ increase,
the differences between lower and upper bounds increase. Because we have
P (X 6= X∗|X∗ = 0−) = p, p represents the proportion of manipulated units
to units who have X∗ less than and close to the cut-off value. Hence, this
result means that the bounds become tighter as the proportion of manipu-
lated units decreases. As seen in Corollary C.1, when µ+ ∈ [1 − r, r], then
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TABLE D.2
Bounds of Theorems 2 and 3
θ θ θS θS r µ+ ∈ [1− r, r]
(p, λ) = (0.1, 0.05) 0.060 0.185 0.060 0.185 0.894 Yes
(p, λ) = (0.1, 0.3) 0.032 0.190 0.032 0.190 0.867 Yes
(p, λ) = (0.3, 0.05) -0.170 0.286 -0.168 0.286 0.687 No
(p, λ) = (0.3, 0.3) -0.287 0.303 -0.254 0.303 0.629 No
the crude bounds θ and θ are consistent with the sharp bounds θ and θ.
Furthermore, Table D.2 shows that θB and θB are close to the sharp bounds
even when µ+ 6∈ [1− r, r].
APPENDIX E: A COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO MONOTONICITY ARGUMENT
Example E.1 Consider (Y (0), Y (1), X,X∗) satisfying Assumptions 2.1,
2.2, 2.3, 2.8.
Consider a simple model such that
E[Y (d)|X∗ = x∗, X = x] = x∗, ∀d ∈ {0, 1}, x∗, x ∈ R.
Therefore, X 6= X∗ affect Y only through exceeding the threshold to get
treated.
Let X∗ ∼ U [−1, 1] with the cut-off at c = 0. Construct X such that
X =

X∗ + 1 if − 1 ≤ X∗ < −2/3
X∗ + 1/3 if − 2/3 ≤ X∗ < −1/3
X∗ if − 1/3 ≤ X∗ ≤ 1.
Then there are only manipulators X > X∗ or non-manipulators X = X∗ so
that the monotonicity holds. The density stays smooth at c = 0 because units
who are −1 ≤ X∗ < −1/3 are equally split into the negative half [−1/3, 0)
and the positive half (0, 1/3].
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However, the conditional mean function is not continuous as
lim
x↑0
E[Y (d)|X = x] = −1/6 6= lim
x↓0
E[Y (d)|X = x] = −1/2.
This failure is excluded in our Type 2 units or Type 3 units satisfy-
ing Assumption 2.6. One-sided precise manipulation Assumption 2.6 elimi-
nates the manipulating units not exceeding the cut-off. The situation in the
counter-example could occur when the higher control type (−2/3 ≤ X∗ <
−1/3) have a different incentive to exceed the “cut-off” of X = −1/3 than
the policy threshold of X = 0.
If such other incentive exists for manipulation, then the order flipping
sorting around the cut-off. Such order flipping manipulation is not detectable
by the density test as the density is smooth at the policy cut-off X = 0, but
the sorting of the units may have occurred. Monotonicity is not enough to
eliminate such possibility.
